USC Subchapter I

USC Subchapter I
in effect

10 U.S.C. § 6111 Stockpile stewardship program

(a) Establishment.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall establish a stewardship program to ensure—(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and (2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing. (b) Program Elements.—The program shall include the following:(1) An increased level of effort for the construction of new facilities and the modernization of existing facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to support the deterrence of strategic attacks against the United States by maintaining and enhancing the performance, reliability, and security of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, including—(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and (B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories. (2) Support for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons. (3) Support for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research. (4) Support for the modernization of facilities and projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States that support the sustainment and modernization of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile and the capabilities required to assess nuclear weapons effects. (5) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, including—(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; (B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and (D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.

10 U.S.C. § 6112 Portfolio management framework for National Nuclear Security Administration

(a) In General.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81), the Administrator shall—(1) in consultation with the Nuclear Weapons Council established under section 179, develop and implement a portfolio management framework for the nuclear security enterprise that—(A) defines the Administration’s portfolio of nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure maintenance and modernization programs; (B) establishes a portfolio governance structure, including portfolio-level selection criteria, prioritization criteria, and performance metrics; (C) outlines the approach of the Administration to managing that portfolio; and (D) incorporates the leading practices identified by the Comptroller General of the United States in the report titled “Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA Should Use Portfolio Management Leading Practices to Support Modernization Efforts” (GAO-21-398) and dated June 2021; and (2) complete an integrated, comprehensive assessment of the portfolio management capabilities required to execute the weapons activities portfolio of the Administration. (b) Briefing Requirement.—Not later than June 1, 2022, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on—(1) the progress of the Administrator in developing the framework described in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) and completing the assessment required by paragraph (2) of that subsection; and (2) the plans of the Administrator for implementing the recommendations of the Comptroller General in the report referred to in paragraph (1)(D) of that subsection.

10 U.S.C. § 6113 Stockpile stewardship criteria

(a) Requirement for Criteria.—The Secretary of Energy shall develop clear and specific criteria for judging whether the science-based tools being used by the Department of Energy for determining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile are performing in a manner that will provide an adequate degree of certainty that the stockpile is safe and reliable. (b) Coordination With Secretary of Defense.—The Secretary of Energy, in developing the criteria required by subsection (a), shall coordinate with the Secretary of Defense.

10 U.S.C. § 6114 Nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, management, and responsiveness plan

(a) Plan Requirement.—The Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials of the departments and agencies of the Federal Government, shall develop and annually update a plan for sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. The plan shall cover, at a minimum, stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, stockpile responsiveness, stockpile surveillance, program direction, infrastructure modernization, human capital, and nuclear test readiness. The plan shall be consistent with the programmatic and technical requirements of the most recent annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. (b) Submissions to Congress.—(1) In accordance with subsection (c), not later than 45 days after each date on which a budget for an odd-numbered fiscal year is submitted to Congress, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a detailed report on the plan developed under subsection (a). (2) The report required by this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Elements of Biennial Detailed Report.—Each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1) shall include, at a minimum, the following:(1) With respect to stockpile stewardship, stockpile management, and stockpile responsiveness—(A) the status of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including the number and age of warheads (including both active and inactive) for each warhead type; (B) for each five-year period occurring during the period beginning on the date of the report and ending on the date that is 20 years after the date of the report—(i) the planned number of nuclear warheads (including active and inactive) for each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; and (ii) the past and projected future total lifecycle cost of each type of nuclear weapon; (C) the status, plans, budgets, and schedules for warhead life extension programs and any other programs to modify, update, or replace warhead types; (D) a description of the process by which the Administrator assesses the lifetimes, and requirements for life extension or replacement, of the nuclear and non-nuclear components of the warheads (including active and inactive warheads) in the nuclear weapons stockpile; (E) a description of the process used in recertifying the safety, security, and reliability of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile; (F) any concerns of the Administrator that would affect the ability of the Administrator to recertify the safety, security, or reliability of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile (including active and inactive warheads); (G) mechanisms to provide for the manufacture, maintenance, and modernization of each warhead type in the nuclear weapons stockpile, as needed; (H) mechanisms to expedite the collection of information necessary for carrying out the stockpile management program required by section 6116, including information relating to the aging of materials and components, new manufacturing techniques, and the replacement or substitution of materials; (I) mechanisms to ensure the appropriate assignment of roles and missions for each national security laboratory and nuclear weapons production facility, including mechanisms for allocation of workload, mechanisms to ensure the carrying out of appropriate modernization activities, and mechanisms to ensure the retention of skilled personnel; (J) mechanisms to ensure that each national security laboratory has full and complete access to all weapons data to enable a rigorous peer-review process to support the annual assessment of the condition of the nuclear weapons stockpile required under section 6117; (K) mechanisms for allocating funds for activities under the stockpile management program required by section 6116, including allocations of funds by weapon type and facility; (L) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 6116; (M) the status, plans, activities, budgets, and schedules for carrying out the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131; (N) for each of the five fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted, an identification of the funds needed to carry out the program required under section 6131; and (O) as required, when assessing and developing prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries, a report from the directors of the national security laboratories on the need and plan for such assessment and development that includes separate comments on the plan from the Secretary of Energy and the Director of National Intelligence. (2) With respect to science-based tools—(A) a description of the information needed to determine that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable; (B) for each science-based tool used to collect information described in subparagraph (A), the relationship between such tool and such information and the effectiveness of such tool in providing such information based on the criteria developed pursuant to section 6113(a); and (C) the criteria developed under section 6113(a) (including any updates to such criteria). (3) An assessment of the stockpile stewardship program under section 6111(a) by the Administrator, in consultation with the directors of the national security laboratories, which shall set forth—(A) an identification and description of—(i) any key technical challenges to the stockpile stewardship program; and (ii) the strategies to address such challenges without the use of nuclear testing; (B) a strategy for using the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory to ensure that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of nuclear testing; (C) an assessment of the science-based tools (including advanced simulation and computing capabilities) of each national security laboratory that exist at the time of the assessment compared with the science-based tools expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program; and (D) an assessment of the core scientific and technical competencies required to achieve the objectives of the stockpile stewardship program and other weapons activities and weapons-related activities of the Administration, including—(i) the number of scientists, engineers, and technicians, by discipline, required to maintain such competencies; and (ii) a description of any shortage of such individuals that exists at the time of the assessment compared with any shortage expected to exist during the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program. (4) With respect to the nuclear security infrastructure—(A) a description of the construction, modernization, and refurbishment measures the Administrator determines necessary to meet the requirements prescribed in—(i) the national security strategy of the United States as set forth in the most recent national security strategy report of the President under section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3043) if such strategy has been submitted as of the date of the plan; (ii) the most recent national defense strategy as of the date of the plan; and (iii) the most recent Nuclear Posture Review as of the date of the plan; (B) an explanation of the targeted needs addressed by the measures described under subparagraph (A); (C) a schedule for implementing the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the 10-year period following the date of the plan; (D) a summary of identified long-term infrastructure investments needed beyond such 10-year period; (E) a statement of changes to, and progress toward achieving, the measures described under subparagraph (A) during the period covered by the report, compared to such changes and progress during the period covered by the preceding report; (F) the estimated levels of annual funds the Administrator determines necessary to carry out the measures described under subparagraph (A), including a discussion of the criteria, evidence, and strategies on which such estimated levels of annual funds are based; and (G)(i) a description of—(I) the metrics (based on industry best practices) used by the Administrator to determine the infrastructure deferred maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and (II) the percentage of replacement plant value being spent on maintenance and repair needs of the nuclear security enterprise; and (ii) an explanation of whether the annual spending on such needs complies with the recommendation of the National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine that such spending be in an amount equal to four percent of the replacement plant value, and, if not, the reasons for such noncompliance and a plan for how the Administrator will ensure facilities of the nuclear security enterprise are being properly sustained. (5) With respect to the nuclear test readiness of the United States—(A) an estimate of the period of time that would be necessary for the Administrator to conduct an underground test of a nuclear weapon once directed by the President to conduct such a test; (B) a description of the level of test readiness that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines to be appropriate; (C) a list and description of the workforce skills and capabilities that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; (D) a list and description of the infrastructure and physical plants that are essential to carrying out an underground nuclear test at the Nevada National Security Site; and (E) an assessment of the readiness status of the skills and capabilities described in subparagraph (C) and the infrastructure and physical plants described in subparagraph (D). (6) A strategy for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs over a 20-year period that includes the following:(A) An assessment of the baseline science issues necessary to understand plutonium aging under static and dynamic conditions under manufactured and nonmanufactured plutonium geometries. (B) An assessment of scientific and testing instrumentation for plutonium at elemental and bulk conditions. (C) An assessment of manufacturing and handling technology for plutonium and plutonium components. (D) An assessment of computational models of plutonium performance under static and dynamic loading, including manufactured and nonmanufactured conditions. (E) An identification of any capability gaps with respect to the assessments described in subparagraphs (A) through (D). (F) An estimate of costs relating to the issues, instrumentation, technology, and models described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453). (G) An estimate of the cost of eliminating the capability gaps identified under subparagraph (E) over the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program. (H) Such other items as the Administrator considers important for the integrated management of plutonium for stockpile and stockpile stewardship needs. (7) A plan for the research and development, deployment, and lifecycle sustainment of the technologies employed within the nuclear security enterprise to address physical and cyber security threats during the five fiscal years following the date of the report, together with—(A) for each site in the nuclear security enterprise, a description of the technologies deployed to address the physical and cybersecurity threats posed to that site; (B) for each site and for the nuclear security enterprise, the methods used by the Administration to establish priorities among investments in physical and cybersecurity technologies; and (C) a detailed description of how the funds identified for each program element specified pursuant to paragraph (1) in the budget for the Administration for each fiscal year during that five-fiscal-year period will help carry out that plan. (8) An assessment of whether the programs described by the report can be executed with current and projected budgets and any associated risks. (9) Identification of any modifications or updates to the plan since the previous summary or 11 So in original. The words “summary or” probably should not appear. detailed report was submitted under subsection (b). (d) Nuclear Weapons Council Assessment.—(1) For each detailed report on the plan submitted under subsection (b)(1), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall conduct an assessment that includes the following:(A) An analysis of the plan, including—(i) whether the plan supports the requirements of the national security strategy of the United States referred to in subsection (d)(4)(A)(i),22 See References in Text note below. the most recent the national defense strategy, and the most recent Nuclear Posture Review; (ii) whether the modernization and refurbishment measures described under subparagraph (A) of subsection (d)(4) 2 and the schedule described under subparagraph (B) of such subsection 2 are adequate to support such requirements; and (iii) whether the plan supports the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131 in a manner that meets the objectives of such program and an identification of any improvements that may be made to the plan to better carry out such program. (B) An analysis of whether the plan adequately addresses the requirements for infrastructure recapitalization of the facilities of the nuclear security enterprise. (C) If the Nuclear Weapons Council determines that the plan does not adequately support modernization and refurbishment requirements under subparagraph (A) or the nuclear security enterprise facilities infrastructure recapitalization requirements under subparagraph (B), a risk assessment with respect to—(i) supporting the annual certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and (ii) maintaining the long-term safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (2) Not later than 180 days after the date on which the Administrator submits the plan under subsection (b)(1), the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the assessment required under paragraph (1). (e) Definitions.—In this section:(1) The term “budget”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the budget for that fiscal year that is submitted to Congress by the President under section 1105(a) of title 31. (2) The term “future-years nuclear security program” means the program required by section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453). (3) The term “national defense strategy” means the review of the defense programs and policies of the United States that is carried out every four years under section 113(g). (4) The term “nuclear security budget materials”, with respect to a fiscal year, means the materials submitted to Congress by the Administrator in support of the budget for that fiscal year. (5) The term “weapons activities” means each activity within the budget category of weapons activities in the budget of the Administration. (6) The term “weapons-related activities” means each activity under the Department of Energy that involves nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons technology, or fissile or radioactive materials, including activities related to—(A) nuclear nonproliferation; (B) nuclear forensics; (C) nuclear intelligence; (D) nuclear safety; and (E) nuclear incident response.

10 U.S.C. § 6115 Major warhead refurbishment program

In fiscal year 2015 and subsequent fiscal years, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report, on each major warhead refurbishment program that reaches the Phase 6.3 milestone, that provides an analysis of alternatives. Such report shall include— (1) a full description of alternatives considered prior to the award of Phase 6.3; (2) a comparison of the costs and benefits of each of those alternatives, to include an analysis of trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives against each alternative considered; (3) identification of the cost and risk of critical technology elements associated with each alternative, including technology maturity, integration risk, manufacturing feasibility, and demonstration needs; (4) identification of the cost and risk of additional capital asset and infrastructure capabilities required to support production and certification of each alternative; (5) a comparative analysis of the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for any military requirement intended to enhance warhead safety, security, or maintainability, including any requirement to consolidate and/or integrate warhead systems or mods as compared to at least one other feasible refurbishment alternative the Nuclear Weapons Council considers appropriate; and (6) a life-cycle cost estimate for the alternative selected that details the overall cost, scope, and schedule planning assumptions.

10 U.S.C. § 6116 Stockpile management program

(a) Program Required.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program, in support of the stockpile stewardship program, to provide for the effective management, modernization, and replacement, as required, of the weapons in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The program shall have the following objectives:(1) To enhance the performance and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States. (2) To further reduce the likelihood of the resumption of underground nuclear weapons testing. (3) To maintain the safety and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (4) To optimize the future size of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (5) To reduce the risk of an accidental detonation of an element of the stockpile. (6) To reduce the risk of an element of the stockpile being used by a person or entity hostile to the United States, its vital interests, or its allies. (b) Program Limitations.—In carrying out the stockpile management program under subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that—(1) any changes made to the stockpile shall be consistent with the objectives identified in subsection (a); (2) any changes made to the stockpile consistent with the objectives identified in subsection (a) are carried out in a cost effective manner; and (3) any such changes made to the stockpile shall—(A) be well understood and certifiable without the need to resume underground nuclear weapons testing; (B) use the design, certification, and production expertise resident in the nuclear security enterprise to fulfill current mission requirements of the existing stockpile; and (C) develop future generations of design, certification, and production expertise in the nuclear security enterprise to support the fulfillment of mission requirements of the future stockpile. (c) Program Budget.—In accordance with the requirements under section 6120, for each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, the amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget.

10 U.S.C. § 6117 Annual assessments and reports to the President and Congress regarding the condition of the United States nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Annual Assessments Required.—For each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile of the United States, each official specified in subsection (b) on an annual basis shall, to the extent such official is directly responsible for the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness of that nuclear weapon type, complete an assessment of the safety, reliability, performance, or military effectiveness (as the case may be) of that nuclear weapon type. (b) Covered Officials.—The officials referred to in subsection (a) are the following:(1) The head of each national security laboratory. (2) The Commander of the United States Strategic Command. (c) Dual Validation Teams in Support of Assessments.—In support of the assessments required by subsection (a), the Administrator may establish teams, known as “dual validation teams”, to provide each national security laboratory responsible for weapons design with independent evaluations of the condition of each warhead for which such laboratory has lead responsibility. A dual validation team established by the Administrator shall—(1) be comprised of weapons experts from the laboratory that does not have lead responsibility for fielding the warhead being evaluated; (2) have access to all surveillance and underground test data for all stockpile systems for use in the independent evaluations; (3) use all relevant available data to conduct independent calculations; and (4) pursue independent experiments to support the independent evaluations. (d) Use of Teams of Experts for Assessments.—The head of each national security laboratory shall establish and use one or more teams of experts, known as “red teams”, to assist in the assessments required by subsection (a). Each such team shall include experts from both of the other national security laboratories. Each such team for a national security laboratory shall—(1) review both the matters covered by the assessments under subsection (a) performed by the head of that laboratory and any independent evaluations conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); (2) subject such matters to challenge; and (3) submit the results of such review and challenge, together with the findings and recommendations of such team with respect to such review and challenge, to the head of that laboratory. (e) Report on Assessments.—Not later than December 1 of each year, each official specified in subsection (b) shall submit to the Secretary concerned, and to the Nuclear Weapons Council, a report on the assessments that such official was required by subsection (a) to complete. The report shall include the following:(1) The results of each such assessment. (2)(A) Such official’s determination as to whether or not one or more underground nuclear tests are necessary to resolve any issues identified in the assessments and, if so—(i) an identification of the specific underground nuclear tests that are necessary to resolve such issues; and (ii) a discussion of why options other than an underground nuclear test are not available or would not resolve such issues. (B) An identification of the specific underground nuclear tests which, while not necessary, might have value in resolving any such issues and a discussion of the anticipated value of conducting such tests. (C) Such official’s determination as to the readiness of the United States to conduct the underground nuclear tests identified under subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B), if directed by the President to do so. (3) In the case of a report submitted by the head of a national security laboratory—(A) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the science-based tools and methods, including with respect to cyber assurance, being used to determine the matters covered by the assessments; (B) a concise statement regarding the adequacy of the tools and methods employed by the manufacturing infrastructure required by section 6122 to identify and fix any inadequacy with respect to the matters covered by the assessments, and the confidence of the head in such tools and methods; (C) a concise summary of the findings and recommendations of any teams under subsection (d) that relate to the assessments, together with a discussion of those findings and recommendations; (D) a concise summary of the results of any independent evaluation conducted by a dual validation team under subsection (c); and (E) a concise summary of any significant finding investigations initiated or active during the previous year for which the head of the national security laboratory has full or partial responsibility. (4) In the case of a report submitted by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command—(A) a discussion of the relative merits of other nuclear weapon types (if any), or compensatory measures (if any) that could be taken, that could enable accomplishment of the missions of the nuclear weapon types to which the assessments relate, should such assessments identify any deficiency with respect to such nuclear weapon types; (B) a summary of all major assembly releases in place as of the date of the report for the active and inactive nuclear weapon stockpiles; and (C) the views of the Commander on the stockpile responsiveness program under section 6131, the activities conducted under such program, and any suggestions to improve such program. (5) An identification and discussion of any matter having an adverse effect on the capability of the official submitting the report to accurately determine the matters covered by the assessments. (f) Submittals to the President and Congress.—(1) Not later than February 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the President—(A) each report, without change, submitted to either Secretary under subsection (e) during the preceding year; (B) any comments that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate with respect to each such report; (C) the conclusions that the Secretaries individually or jointly reach as to the safety, reliability, performance, and military effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States; and (D) any other information that the Secretaries individually or jointly consider appropriate. (2) Not later than March 15 of each year, the President shall forward to Congress the matters received by the President under paragraph (1) for that year, together with any comments the President considers appropriate. (3) If the President does not forward to Congress the matters required under paragraph (2) by the date required by such paragraph, the officials specified in subsection (b) shall provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees not later than March 30 on the report such officials submitted to the Secretary concerned under subsection (e). (g) Classified Form.—Each submittal under subsection (f) shall be in classified form only, with the classification level required for each portion of such submittal marked appropriately. (h) Definition.—In this section, the term “Secretary concerned” means—(1) the Secretary of Energy, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Energy; and (2) the Secretary of Defense, with respect to matters concerning the Department of Defense.

10 U.S.C. § 6118 Form of certifications regarding the safety or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile

Any certification submitted to the President by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Energy regarding confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type in the United States nuclear weapons stockpile shall be submitted in classified form only.

10 U.S.C. § 6119 Nuclear test ban readiness program

(a) Establishment of Program.—The Secretary of Energy shall establish and support a program to assure that the United States is in a position to maintain the reliability, safety, and continued deterrent effect of its stockpile of existing nuclear weapons designs in the event that a low-threshold or comprehensive ban on nuclear explosives testing is negotiated and ratified within the framework agreed to by the United States and the Russian Federation. (b) Purposes of Program.—The purposes of the program under subsection (a) shall be the following:(1) To assure that the United States maintains a vigorous program of stockpile inspection and non-explosive testing so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban is entered into, the United States remains able to detect and identify potential problems in stockpile reliability and safety in existing designs of nuclear weapons. (2) To assure that the specific materials, components, processes, and personnel needed for the remanufacture of existing nuclear weapons or the substitution of alternative nuclear warheads are available to support such remanufacture or substitution if such action becomes necessary in order to satisfy reliability and safety requirements under a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement. (3) To assure that a vigorous program of research in areas related to nuclear weapons science and engineering is supported so that, if a low-threshold or comprehensive test ban agreement is entered into, the United States is able to maintain a base of technical knowledge about nuclear weapons design and nuclear weapons effects. (c) Conduct of Program.—The Secretary of Energy shall carry out the program provided for in subsection (a). The program shall be carried out with the participation of representatives of the Department of Defense, the nuclear weapons production facilities, and the national security laboratories.

10 U.S.C. § 6120 Requirements for specific request for new or modified nuclear weapons

(a) Requirement for Request for Funds for Development.—(1) In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2002 in which the Secretary of Energy plans to carry out activities described in paragraph (2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon beyond phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process, the Secretary—(A) shall specifically request funds for such activities in the budget of the President for that fiscal year under section 1105(a) of title 31; and (B) may carry out such activities only if amounts are authorized to be appropriated for such activities by an Act of Congress consistent with section 660 of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7270). (2) The activities described in this paragraph are as follows:(A) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States. (B) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a new nuclear weapon by the United States. (C) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of research and development for the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States. (D) The conduct, or provision for conduct, of engineering or manufacturing to carry out the production of a modified nuclear weapon by the United States. (b) Budget Request Format.—In a request for funds under subsection (a), the Secretary shall include a dedicated line item for each activity described in subsection (a)(2) for a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that is in phase 2 or higher or phase 6.2 or higher (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process. (c) Notification and Briefing of Noncovered Activities.—In any fiscal year after fiscal year 2022, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, in conjunction with the annual submission of the budget of the President to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, shall notify the congressional defense committees of—(1) any activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon that, during the calendar year prior to the budget submission, were carried out prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process; and (2) any plans to carry out, prior to phase 2 or phase 6.2 (as the case may be) of the nuclear weapon acquisition process, activities described in subsection (a)(2) relating to the development of a new nuclear weapon or modified nuclear weapon during the fiscal year covered by that budget. (d) Definitions.—In this section:(1) The term “modified nuclear weapon” means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which—(A) is in the nuclear weapons stockpile as of December 2, 2002; and (B) is being modified in order to meet a military requirement that is other than the military requirements applicable to such nuclear weapon when first placed in the nuclear weapons stockpile. (2) The term “new nuclear weapon” means a nuclear weapon that contains a pit or canned subassembly, either of which is neither—(A) in the nuclear weapons stockpile on December 2, 2002; nor (B) in production as of that date.

10 U.S.C. § 6121 Testing of nuclear weapons

(a) Underground Testing.—No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear test after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted. (b) Atmospheric Testing.—None of the funds appropriated pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103–160; 107 Stat. 1547) or any other Act for any fiscal year may be available to maintain the capability of the United States to conduct atmospheric testing of a nuclear weapon.

10 U.S.C. § 6122 Manufacturing infrastructure for refabrication and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Manufacturing Program.—(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out a program for purposes of establishing within the Government a manufacturing infrastructure that has the capabilities of meeting the following objectives:(A) To provide a stockpile surveillance engineering base. (B) To refabricate and certify weapon components and types in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile, as necessary. (C) To fabricate and certify new nuclear warheads, as necessary. (D) To support nuclear weapons. (E) To supply sufficient tritium in support of nuclear weapons to ensure an upload hedge in the event circumstances require. (2) The purpose of the program carried out under paragraph (1) shall also be to develop manufacturing capabilities and capacities necessary to meet the requirements specified in the annual Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum. (b) Required Capabilities.—The manufacturing infrastructure established under the program under subsection (a) shall include the following capabilities (modernized to attain the objectives referred to in that subsection):(1) The weapons assembly and high explosives manufacturing capabilities of the Pantex Plant. (2) The weapon secondary fabrication capabilities of the Y–12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (3) The capabilities of the Savannah River Site relating to tritium recycling and processing. (4) The fissile material component processing and fabrication capabilities of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. (5) The non-nuclear component capabilities of the Kansas City National Security Campus, Kansas City, Missouri.

10 U.S.C. § 6123 Acceleration of depleted uranium manufacturing processes

(a) Acceleration of Manufacturing.—The Administrator shall require the nuclear security enterprise to accelerate the modernization of manufacturing processes for depleted uranium by 2030 so that the nuclear security enterprise—(1) demonstrates bulk cold hearth melting of depleted uranium alloys to augment existing capabilities on an operational basis for war reserve components; (2) manufactures, on a repeatable and ongoing basis, war reserve depleted uranium alloy components using net shape casting; (3) demonstrates, if possible, a production facility to conduct routine operations for manufacturing depleted uranium alloy components outside of the current perimeter security fencing of the Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and (4) has available high purity depleted uranium for the production of war reserve components. (b) Annual Briefing.—Not later than March 31, 2023, and annually thereafter through 2030, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on—(1) progress made in carrying out subsection (a); (2) the cost of activities conducted under such subsection during the preceding fiscal year; and (3) the ability of the nuclear security enterprise to convert depleted uranium fluoride hexafluoride to depleted uranium tetrafluoride.

10 U.S.C. § 6124 Reports on critical difficulties at national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities

(a) Reports by Heads of Laboratories and Facilities.—In the event of a difficulty at a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility that has a significant bearing on confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon type, the head of the laboratory or facility, as the case may be, shall submit to the Administrator a report on the difficulty. The head of the laboratory or facility shall submit the report as soon as practicable after discovery of the difficulty. (b) Transmittal by Administrator.—Not later than 10 days after receipt of a report under subsection (a), the Administrator shall transmit the report (together with the comments of the Administrator) to the congressional defense committees, to the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense, and to the President. (c) Inclusion of Reports in Annual Stockpile Assessment.—Any report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall also be submitted to the President and Congress with the matters required to be submitted under section 6117(f) for the year in which such report is submitted.

10 U.S.C. § 6125 Selected acquisition reports 11 So in original. Probably should be “Selected Acquisition Reports”. and independent cost estimates and reviews of certain programs and facilities

(a) Selected Acquisition Reports.—(1) At the end of the first quarter of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension and each major alteration project (as defined in section 6284(a)(2)) during the preceding fiscal year. The reports shall be known as Selected Acquisition Reports for the weapon system concerned. (2) The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a nuclear weapon system shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for each fiscal-year quarter in that fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under section 4351 or any successor system, expressed in terms of the nuclear weapon system. (b) Independent Cost Estimates and Reviews.—(1) The Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall submit to the congressional defense committees and the Nuclear Weapons Council the following:(A) An independent cost estimate of the following:(i) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2A or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2A, relating to design definition and cost study. (ii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.3 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 3, relating to development engineering. (iii) Each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 6.5, relating to first production. (iv) Each new weapon system at the completion of phase 4, relating to production engineering, and before the initiation of phase 5, relating to first production. (v) Each new nuclear facility within the nuclear security enterprise that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000 before such facility achieves critical decision 1 and before such facility achieves critical decision 2 in the acquisition process. (vi) Each nuclear weapons system undergoing a major alteration project (as defined in section 6284(a)(2)). (B) An independent cost review of each nuclear weapon system undergoing life extension at the completion of phase 6.2 or new weapon system at the completion of phase 2, relating to study of feasibility and down-select. (2) Each independent cost estimate and independent cost review under paragraph (1) shall include—(A) whether the cost baseline or the budget estimate for the period covered by the future-years nuclear security program has changed, and the rationale for any such change; and (B) any views of the Secretary or the Administrator regarding such estimate or review. (3) The Administrator shall review and consider the results of any independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility, as the case may be, under this subsection before entering the next phase of the development process of such system or the acquisition process of such facility. (4) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (1), each independent cost estimate or independent cost review of a nuclear weapon system or a nuclear facility under this subsection shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date on which—(A) in the case of a nuclear weapons system, such system completes a phase specified in such paragraph; or (B) in the case of a nuclear facility, such facility achieves critical decision 1 as specified in subparagraph (A)(v) of such paragraph. (5) Each independent cost estimate or independent cost review submitted under this subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary. (c) Authority for Further Assessments.—Upon the request of the Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and in consultation with the Administrator, may conduct an independent cost assessment of any initiative or program of the Administration that is estimated to cost more than $500,000,000.

10 U.S.C. § 6126 Advice to President and Congress regarding safety, security, and reliability of United States nuclear weapons stockpile

(a) Policy.—(1) It is the policy of the United States—(A) to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and (B) as long as other nations control or actively seek to acquire nuclear weapons, to retain a credible nuclear deterrent. (2) It is in the security interest of the United States to sustain the United States nuclear weapons stockpile through a program of stockpile stewardship, carried out at the national security laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities. (3) It is the sense of Congress that—(A) the United States should retain a triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against the vital interests of the United States; (B) the United States should continue to maintain nuclear forces of sufficient size and capability to implement an effective and robust deterrent strategy; and (C) the advice of the persons required to provide the President and Congress with assurances of the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons force should be scientifically based, without regard for politics, and of the highest quality and integrity. (b) Advice and Opinions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Stockpile.—In addition to a director of a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility under section 6124, any member of the Nuclear Weapons Council may also submit to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, or the congressional defense committees advice or opinion regarding the safety, security, effectiveness, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. (c) Expression of Individual Views.—(1) No individual, including a representative of the President, may take any action against, or otherwise constrain, a director of a national security laboratory or a nuclear weapons production facility or a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council from presenting the professional views of the director or member, as the case may be, to the President, the National Security Council, or Congress regarding—(A) the safety, security, reliability, or credibility of the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces; or (B) the status of, and plans for, the capabilities and infrastructure that support and sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear forces. (2) Nothing in paragraph (1)(B) may be construed to affect the interagency budget process. (d) Representative of the President Defined.—In this section, the term “representative of the President” means the following:(1) Any official of the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. (2) Any member or official of the National Security Council. (3) Any member or official of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (4) Any official of the Office of Management and Budget.

10 U.S.C. § 6127 Notification of certain regulations that impact the National Nuclear Security Administration

(a) In General.—If a director of a national security laboratory of the Administration determines that a Federal regulation could inhibit the ability of the Administrator to maintain the safety, security, or effectiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile without engaging in explosive nuclear testing, such director, not later than 15 days after making such determination, shall submit to Congress a notification of such determination. (b) Form.—Each notification required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

10 U.S.C. § 6128 Plutonium pit production capacity

(a) Requirement.—Consistent with the requirements of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the nuclear security enterprise—(1) during 2021, begins production of qualification plutonium pits; (2) during 2024, produces not less than 10 war reserve plutonium pits; (3) during 2025, produces not less than 20 war reserve plutonium pits; (4) during 2026, produces not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits; and (5) during 2030, produces not less than 80 war reserve plutonium pits. (b) Annual Certification.—Not later than March 1, 2015, and each year thereafter through 2030, the Secretary of Energy shall certify to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary of Defense that the programs and budget of the Secretary of Energy will enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a). (c) Plan.—If the Secretary of Energy does not make a certification under subsection (b) by March 1 of any year in which a certification is required under that subsection, by not later than May 1 of such year, the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan to enable the nuclear security enterprise to meet the requirements under subsection (a). Such plan shall include identification of the resources of the Department of Energy that the Chairman determines should be redirected to support the plan to meet such requirements. (d) Certifications on Plutonium Enterprise.—(1) Not later than 30 days after the date on which a covered project achieves a critical decision milestone, the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs shall jointly certify to the congressional defense committees that the operations, infrastructure, and workforce of such project are adequate to carry out the delivery and disposal of planned waste shipments relating to the plutonium enterprise, as outlined in the critical decision memoranda of the Department of Energy with respect to such project. (2) If the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management and the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs fail to make a certification under paragraph (1) by the date specified in such paragraph with respect to a covered project achieving a critical decision milestone, the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Administrator shall jointly submit to the congressional defense committees, by not later than 30 days after such date, a plan to ensure that the operations, infrastructure, and workforce of such project will be adequate to carry out the delivery and disposal of planned waste shipments described in such paragraph. (e) Reports.—(1) Not later than March 1 of each year during the period beginning on the date on which the first covered project achieves critical decision 2 in the acquisition process and ending on the date on which the second project achieves critical decision 4 and begins operations, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the planned production goals of both covered projects during the first 10 years of the operation of the projects. (2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include—(A) the number of war reserve plutonium pits planned to be produced during each year, including the associated warhead type; (B) a description of risks and challenges to meeting the performance baseline for the covered projects, as approved in critical decision 2 in the acquisition process; (C) options available to the Administrator to balance scope, costs, and production requirements at the projects to decrease overall risk to the plutonium enterprise and enduring plutonium pit requirements; and (D) an explanation of any changes to the production goals or requirements as compared to the report submitted during the previous year. (f) Capacity.—In carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Energy shall—(1) ensure that Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, has the capability to reliably produce no fewer than 30 war reserve plutonium pits annually; and (2) ensure that the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility at the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, has the capability to reliably produce no fewer than 50 war reserve plutonium pits annually. (g) Prohibition on ARIES Expansion Before Achievement of 30 Pit-per-year Base Capability.—(1) Until the date on which the Administrator certifies to the congressional defense committees that the base capability to produce not less than 30 war reserve plutonium pits per year has been established at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Administrator may not—(A) carry out a project to expand the pit disassembly and processing capability of the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023; or (B) otherwise expand such spaces. (2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to—(A) ongoing or planned small projects to sustain or improve the efficiency of plutonium oxide production, provided that such projects do not expand the spaces at PF–4 occupied by ARIES as of December 22, 2023; (B) the planning and design of an additional ARIES capability at a location other than PF–4; or (C) the transfer of the ARIES capability to a location other than PF–4. (3) In this subsection:(A) The term “ARIES” means the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System method, developed and piloted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, for disassembling surplus defense plutonium pits and converting the plutonium from such pits into plutonium oxide. (B) The term “PF–4” means the Plutonium Facility at Technical Area 55 located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. (h) Management of Plutonium Modernization Program.—Not later than 570 days after December 22, 2023, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall ensure that the plutonium modernization program established by the Office of Defense Programs of the National Nuclear Security Administration, or any subsequently developed program designed to meet the requirements under subsection (a), is managed in accordance with the best practices for schedule development and cost estimating of the Government Accountability Office. (i) Covered Project Defined.—In this section, the term “covered project” means—(1) the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (Project 21–D–511); or (2) the Plutonium Pit Production Project, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico (Project 21–D–512).

10 U.S.C. § 6129 Certification of completion of milestones with respect to plutonium pit aging

(a) Requirement.—The Administrator shall complete the milestones on plutonium pit aging identified in the report entitled “Research Program Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging”, published by the Administration in September 2021. (b) Assessments.—The Administrator shall—(1) acting through the Defense Programs Advisory Committee, conduct biennial reviews during the period beginning not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending December 31, 2030, regarding the progress achieved toward completing the milestones described in subsection (a); and (2) seek to enter into an arrangement with the private scientific advisory group known as JASON to conduct, not later than 2030, an assessment of plutonium pit aging. (c) Briefings.—During the period beginning not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending December 31, 2030, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees biennial briefings on—(1) the progress achieved toward completing the milestones described in subsection (a); and (2) the results of the assessments described in subsection (b). (d) Certification of Completion of Milestones.—Not later than October 1, 2031, the Administrator shall—(1) certify to the congressional defense committees whether the milestones described in subsection (a) have been achieved; and (2) if the milestones have not been achieved, submit to such committees a report—(A) describing the reasons such milestones have not been achieved; (B) including, if the Administrator determines the Administration will not be able to meet one of such milestones, an explanation for that determination; and (C) specifying new dates for the completion of the milestones the Administrator anticipates the Administration will meet.

10 U.S.C. § 6130 Authorization of workforce development and training partnership programs within National Nuclear Security Administration

(a) Authority.—The Administrator for Nuclear Security may authorize management and operating contractors at covered facilities to develop and implement workforce development and training partnership programs to further the education and training of employees or prospective employees of such management and operating contractors to meet the requirements of section 6128. (b) Capacity.—To carry out subsection (a), a management and operating contractor at a covered facility may provide funding through grants or other means to cover the costs of the development and implementation of a workforce development and training partnership program authorized under such subsection, including costs relating to curriculum development, hiring of teachers, procurement of equipment and machinery, use of facilities or other properties, and provision of scholarships and fellowships. (c) Definitions.—In this section:(1) The term “covered facility” means—(A) Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico; or (B) the Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina. (2) The term “prospective employee” means an individual who has applied (or who, based on their field of study and experience, is likely to apply) for a position of employment with a management and operating contractor to support plutonium pit production at a covered facility.

10 U.S.C. § 6131 Stockpile responsiveness program

(a) Statement of Policy.—It is the policy of the United States to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons to ensure the nuclear deterrent of the United States remains safe, secure, reliable, credible, and responsive. (b) Program Required.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a stockpile responsiveness program, along with the stockpile stewardship program under section 6111 and the stockpile management program under section 6116, to identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all capabilities required to conceptualize, study, design, develop, engineer, certify, produce, and deploy nuclear weapons. (c) Objectives.—The program under subsection (b) shall have the following objectives:(1) Identify, sustain, enhance, integrate, and continually exercise all of the capabilities, infrastructure, tools, and technologies across the science, engineering, design, certification, and manufacturing cycle required to carry out all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process, with respect to both the nuclear security enterprise and relevant elements of the Department of Defense. (2) Identify, enhance, and transfer knowledge, skills, and direct experience with respect to all phases of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process from one generation of nuclear weapon designers and engineers to the following generation. (3) Continually demonstrate stockpile responsiveness throughout the range of capabilities as required, such as through the use of prototypes, flight testing, integrated system demonstrations, and development of plans for certification without the need for nuclear explosive testing. (4) Develop technologies for transition to a nuclear stockpile life extension program or new nuclear weapon program project that have the potential to reduce design, certification, and manufacturing cycles cost and schedule. (5) Continually exercise processes for the integration and coordination of all relevant elements and processes of the Administration and the Department of Defense required to ensure stockpile responsiveness. (6) The retention of the ability, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, to assess and develop prototype nuclear weapons of foreign countries if needed to meet intelligence requirements and, if necessary, to conduct no-yield testing of those prototypes. (d) Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process Defined.—In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle process” means the process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear weapons.

10 U.S.C. § 6132 Long-term plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium

(a) In General.—Not later than December 31 of each odd-numbered year through 2031, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for meeting national security requirements for unencumbered uranium through 2070. (b) Plan Requirements.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall include the following:(1) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is allocated to national security requirements. (2) An inventory of unencumbered uranium (other than depleted uranium), by program source and enrichment level, that, as of the date of the plan, is not allocated to national security requirements but could be allocated to such requirements. (3) An identification of national security requirements for unencumbered uranium through 2070, by program source and enrichment level. (4) An assessment of current and projected unencumbered uranium production by private industry in the United States that could support future defense requirements. (5) A description of any shortfall in obtaining unencumbered uranium to meet national security requirements and an assessment of whether that shortfall could be mitigated through the blending down of uranium that is of a higher enrichment level. (6) An inventory of unencumbered depleted uranium, an assessment of the portion of that uranium that could be allocated to national security requirements through re-enrichment, and an estimate of the costs of re-enriching that uranium. (7) A description of the swap and barter agreements involving unencumbered uranium needed to meet national security requirements that are in effect on the date of the plan. (8) An assessment of—(A) when additional enrichment of uranium will be required to meet national security requirements; and (B) the options the Secretary is considering to meet such requirements, including an estimated cost and timeline for each option and a description of any changes to policy or law that the Secretary determines would be required for each option. (9) An assessment of how options to provide additional enriched uranium to meet national security requirements could, as an additional benefit, contribute to the establishment of a sustained domestic enrichment capacity and allow the commercial sector of the United States to reduce reliance on importing uranium from adversary countries. (c) Form of Plan.—The plan required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Comptroller General Briefing.—Not later than 180 days after the date on which the congressional defense committees receive each plan under subsection (a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall provide to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a briefing that includes an assessment of the plan. (e) Definitions.—In this section:(1) The term “depleted”, with respect to uranium, means that the uranium is depleted in uranium-235 compared with natural uranium. (2) The term “unencumbered”, with respect to uranium, means that the United States has no obligation to foreign governments to use the uranium for only peaceful purposes.

10 U.S.C. § 6133 Plan for domestic enrichment capability to satisfy Department of Defense uranium requirements

(a) Report.—Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (Public Law 118–31), the Administrator shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that contains a plan to establish a domestic enrichment capability sufficient to meet defense requirements for enriched uranium. Such plan shall include—(1) a description of defense requirements for enriched uranium expected to be necessary between the date of the enactment of this Act and 2060 to meet the requirements of the Department of Defense, including quantities, material assay, and the dates by which new enrichment is required; (2) key milestones, steps, and policy decisions required to achieve the domestic uranium enrichment capability; (3) the dates by which such key milestones are to be achieved; (4) a funding profile, broken down by project and sub-project, for obtaining such capability; (5) a description of any changes in the requirement of the Department of Defense for highly enriched uranium due to AUKUS; and (6) any other elements or information the Administrator determines appropriate. (b) Annual Certification Requirement.—(1) Not later than February 1 of each year after the year during which the report required by subsection (a) is submitted until the date specified in paragraph (2), the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a certification that—(A) the Administration is in compliance with the plan and milestones contained in the report; or (B) the Administration is not in compliance with such plan or milestones, together with—(i) a description of the nature of the non-compliance; (ii) the reasons for the non-compliance; and (iii) a plan to achieve compliance. (2) No report shall be required under paragraph (1) after the date on which the Administrator certifies to the congressional defense committees that the final key milestone under the plan has been met. (c) Form of Reports.—The report under subsection (a) and each annual certification under subsection (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

10 U.S.C. § 6134 Incorporation of integrated surety architecture

(a) Shipments.—(1) The Administrator shall ensure that shipments described in paragraph (2) incorporate surety technologies relating to transportation and shipping developed by the Integrated Surety Architecture program of the Administration. (2) A shipment described in this paragraph is an over-the-road shipment of the Administration that involves any nuclear weapon planned to be in the active stockpile after 2025. (b) Certain Programs.—(1) The Administrator, in coordination with the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, shall ensure that each program described in paragraph (2) incorporates integrated designs compatible with the Integrated Surety Architecture program. (2) A program described in this subsection is a program of the Administration that is a warhead development program, a life extension program, or a warhead major alteration program. (c) Determination.—(1) If, on a case-by-case basis, the Administrator determines that a shipment under subsection (a) will not incorporate some or all of the surety technologies described in such subsection, or that a program under subsection (b) will not incorporate some or all of the integrated designs described in such subsection, the Administrator shall submit such determination to the congressional defense committees, including the results of an analysis conducted pursuant to paragraph (2). (2) Each determination made under paragraph (1) shall be based on a documented, system risk analysis that considers security risk reduction, operational impacts, and technical risk. (d) Termination.—The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) shall terminate on December 31, 2029.

10 U.S.C. § 6135 W93 nuclear warhead acquisition process

(a) Reporting Requirements.—(1) Upon receiving a concept definition study under phase 1 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon, the Nuclear Weapons Council shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes the following:(A) A description of the potential military characteristics of the weapon. (B) A description of the stockpile-to-target sequence requirements of the weapon. (C) An initial assessment of the requirements a W93 nuclear weapon program is likely to generate for the nuclear security enterprise, including—(i) adjustments to the size and composition of the workforce; (ii) additions to existing weapon design and production capabilities; or (iii) additional facility recapitalization or new construction. (D) A preliminary description of other significant requirements for a W93 nuclear weapon program, including—(i) first production unit date; (ii) initial operational capability date; (iii) full operational capability date; and (iv) any unique safety and surety requirements that could increase design complexity or cost estimate uncertainty. (2)(A) Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Nuclear Weapons Council approves phase 2 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon, the Administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on a plan to implement a process of independent peer review or review by a board of experts, or both, with respect to—(i) the nonnuclear components of the weapon; (ii) subsystem design; and (iii) engineering aspects of the weapon. (B) The Administrator shall ensure that the process required by subparagraph (A)—(i) uses—(I) all relevant capabilities of the Federal Government, the defense industrial base, and institutions of higher education; and (II) other capabilities that the Administrator determines necessary; and (ii) informs the entire development life cycle of the W93 nuclear weapon. (b) Certifications and Reports at Phase 3.—Not later than 15 days after the date on which the Nuclear Weapons Council approves phase 3 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the W93 nuclear weapon—(1) the administrator shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing that includes certifications that—(A) phases 1 through 5 of the joint nuclear weapons life cycle for the weapon will employ, at a minimum, the same best practices and will provide Congress with the same level of programmatic insight as exists under the phase 6.X process for life extension programs; and (B) the proposed design for the weapon can be carried out within estimated schedule and cost objectives; and (2) the Commander of the United States Strategic Command shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report containing, or provide to such committees a briefing on, the requirements for weapon quantity and composition by type for the sub-surface ballistic nuclear (SSBN) force, including such requirements planned for the 15-year period following the date of the report or briefing, as the case may be, including any planned life extensions, retirements, or alterations. (c) Waivers.—Subsections (a) and (b) may be waived during a period of war declared by Congress after January 1, 2021. (d) Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Defined.—In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle” has the meaning given that term in section 6131.

10 U.S.C. § 6136 Earned value management and technology readiness levels for life extension programs

(a) Review of Contractor Earned Value Management Systems.—The Administrator shall enter into an arrangement with an independent entity under which that entity shall—(1) review and validate whether the earned value management systems of contractors of the Administration for life extension programs meet the earned value management national standard; and (2) conduct periodic surveillance reviews of such systems to ensure that such systems maintain compliance with that standard through program completion. (b) Benchmarks for Technology Readiness Levels.—The Administrator shall—(1) establish specific benchmarks for technology readiness levels of critical technologies for life extension programs at key decision points; and (2) ensure that critical technologies meet such benchmarks at such decision points. (c) Applicability.—This section shall apply to programs that, as of January 1, 2021, have not entered phase 3 of the nuclear weapons acquisition process or phase 6.3 of a nuclear weapons life extension program. (d) Definition.—In this section, the term “earned value management national standard” means the most recent version of the EIA-748 Earned Value Management System Standard published by the National Defense Industrial Association.

10 U.S.C. § 6137 Rapid capabilities program

(a) In General.—The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall carry out a program (to be known as the “rapid capabilities program”) to develop new nuclear weapons or modified nuclear weapons that meet military requirements. (b) Objectives.—The program under subsection (a) shall have the following objectives:(1) Identify and assess potential design concepts for rapid development feasability. (2) Carry out projects with the goal of achieving first production unit within 5 years of project initiation. (3) Utilize non-traditional approaches, system-specific requirements, and tailored risk-acceptance processes to favorably balance cost, schedule, and capability. (4) Maximize reuse of existing components, non-serial manufacturing, and limited production quantities. (5) Minimize disruption to other major nuclear weapons stockpile modernization programs. (6) Develop institutional expertise within the nuclear security enterprise for rapid execution of all phases for the joint nuclear weapons life cycle process. (c) Requirements Advisory Board.—In carrying out the objectives of the program under subsection (b), the Administrator shall establish an advisory board, which shall be responsible for advising the Administrator with respect to military and deterrence policy requirements related to the activities of the program. Such advisory board shall be composed of the following members:(1) The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Deterrence, Chemical and Biological Defense Policy and Programs. (2) The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy of the Joint Staff. (3) The Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs. (4) The Deputy Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. (d) Program Budget.—In accordance with the requirements under section 4209, for each budget submitted by the President to Congress under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, the amounts requested for the program under this section shall be clearly identified in the budget justification materials submitted to Congress in support of that budget. (e) Joint Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle Process Defined.—In this section, the term “joint nuclear weapons life cycle process” means the process developed and maintained by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy for the development, production, maintenance, and retirement of nuclear weapons.

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