Provisions Applicable to Offenses Generally

C.R.S. tit. 18, art. 1
in effect

C.R.S. § 18-1-101 Citation of title 18

18-1-101. Citation of title 18. (1) This title shall be known and may be cited as the "Colorado Criminal Code"; within this title, the "Colorado Criminal Code" is sometimes referred to as "this code". (2) The portion of any section, subsection, paragraph, or subparagraph contained in this code which precedes a list of examples, requirements, conditions, or other items may be referred to and cited as the "introductory portion" of the section, subsection, paragraph, or subparagraph.

C.R.S. § 18-1-102 Purpose of code, statutory construction

18-1-102. Purpose of code, statutory construction. (1) This code shall be construed in such manner as to promote maximum fulfillment of its general purposes, namely: (a) To define offenses, to define adequately the act and mental state which constitute each offense, to place limitations upon the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault, and to give fair warning to all persons concerning the nature of the conduct prohibited and the penalties authorized upon conviction; (b) To forbid the commission of offenses and to prevent their occurrence through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized; to provide for the rehabilitation of those convicted and their punishment when required in the interests of public protection; (c) To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses, and prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities as between individual offenders; (d) To prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses and to identify certain minimum standards for criminal justice which, within the concept of due process of law, have the stature of substantive rights of persons accused of crime; (e) To promote acceptance of responsibility and accountability by offenders and to provide restoration and healing for victims and the community while attempting to reduce recidivism and the costs to society by the use of restorative justice practices.

C.R.S. § 18-1-102.5 Purposes of code with respect to sentencing

18-1-102.5. Purposes of code with respect to sentencing. (1) The purposes of this code with respect to sentencing are: (a) To punish a convicted offender by assuring the imposition of a sentence he deserves in relation to the seriousness of his offense; (b) To assure the fair and consistent treatment of all convicted offenders by eliminating unjustified disparity in sentences, providing fair warning of the nature of the sentence to be imposed, and establishing fair procedures for the imposition of sentences; (c) To prevent crime and promote respect for the law by providing an effective deterrent to others likely to commit similar offenses; (d) To promote rehabilitation by encouraging correctional programs that elicit the voluntary cooperation and participation of convicted offenders; (e) To select a sentence, a sentence length, and a level of supervision that addresses the offender's individual characteristics and reduces the potential that the offender will engage in criminal conduct after completing his or her sentence; and (f) To promote acceptance of responsibility and accountability by offenders and to provide restoration and healing for victims and the community while attempting to reduce recidivism and the costs to society by the use of restorative justice practices.

C.R.S. § 18-1-103 Scope and application of code

18-1-103. Scope and application of code. (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided by sections 18-1.3-402 and 18-1.3-504, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this code govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in any statute of this state, whether in this title or elsewhere, and which is committed on or after July 1, 1972, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. (2) Except as otherwise provided by section 18-1-410, the provisions of this code do not apply to or govern the construction of, prosecution for, and punishment for any offense committed prior to July 1, 1972, or the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense shall be tried and disposed of according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this code had not been enacted. All pending actions shall proceed to final disposition in the same manner as if this code had not been enacted. (3) The provisions of this code do not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action for any conduct which this code makes punishable; and the civil injury is not merged in the offense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-104 "Offense" defined - offenses classified - common-law crimes abolished

18-1-104. "Offense" defined - offenses classified - common-law crimes abolished. (1) The terms "offense" and "crime" are synonymous and mean a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed. (2) Each offense falls into one of nine classes, one of six drug offense levels, or one unclassified category. There are six classes of felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401 and four levels of drug felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401.5, two classes of misdemeanors as described in section 18-1.3-501 and two levels of drug misdemeanors as described in section 18-1.3-501, petty offenses as described in section 18-1.3-503, civil infractions as described in section 18-1.3-503, and the category of drug petty offense as described in section 18-1.3-501 (1)(e). (3) Common-law crimes are abolished and no conduct shall constitute an offense unless it is described as an offense in this code or in another statute of this state, but this provision does not affect the power of a court to punish for contempt, or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement of an order lawfully entered, or a civil judgment or decree; nor does it affect the use of case law as an interpretive aid in the construction of the provisions of this code.

C.R.S. § 18-1-105 Felonies classified - presumptive penalties

18-1-105. Felonies classified - presumptive penalties. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-106 Misdemeanors classified - penalties

18-1-106. Misdemeanors classified - penalties. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-107 Petty offenses classified - penalties

18-1-107. Petty offenses classified - penalties. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-109 Penalty not fixed by statute - punishment

18-1-109. Penalty not fixed by statute - punishment. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-110 Payment and collection of fines for class 1, 2, or 3 misdemeanors and class 1 or 2 petty offenses - release from incarceration

18-1-110. Payment and collection of fines for class 1, 2, or 3 misdemeanors and class 1 or 2 petty offenses - release from incarceration. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-201 State jurisdiction

18-1-201. State jurisdiction. (1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally accountable, if: (a) The conduct constitutes an offense and is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or (b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt, as defined by this code, to commit an offense within the state; or (c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the state, and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or (d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense prohibited under the laws of this state and such other jurisdiction. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if conduct occurs in this state which is an element of an offense or if the result of conduct in this state is such an element. In homicide, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death or the death itself; and if the body of a criminal homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. (3) Whether an offender is in or outside of the state is immaterial to the commission of an offense based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state.

C.R.S. § 18-1-202 Place of trial - applicability

18-1-202. Place of trial - applicability. (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, criminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, or in any other county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred. (2) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is in one county and his victim is in another county at the time of the commission of an act constituting an element of the offense, the offense is committed and trial may be had in either of said counties. (3) In a case involving the death of a person, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which the cause of death is inflicted, or in which death occurs, or in which the body of the deceased or any part of such body is found. (4) Theft of property is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which he exercised control over the property. (5) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is consummated within this state, the offense is committed and the offender shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated. (6) If an offense is committed in or upon any automobile, trailer, railroad car, aircraft, or other vehicle of transportation passing within or over this state, the offense is deemed to have been committed and the offender may be tried in any county through or over which the vehicle of transportation passed. (7) (a) When multiple crimes are based upon the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode and are committed in several counties, the offender may be tried in any county in which any one of the individual crimes could have been tried, regardless of whether or not the counties are in the same judicial district. (b) (I) For purposes of this subsection (7), when a person commits one of the offenses listed in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b) on two or more occasions within a six-month period, it may be considered part of the same criminal episode. Nothing in this subsection (7) shall bar prosecution of an offense that could have been joined in another prosecution. (II) The provisions of subsection (7)(b)(I) of this section apply to the following offenses: (A) Theft, as defined in section 18-4-401; (B) and (C) Repealed. (D) Criminal mischief, as defined in section 18-4-501; (E) Fraud by check, as defined in section 18-5-205; (F) Defrauding a secured creditor or debtor, as defined in section 18-5-206; (G) Failure to pay over assigned accounts, as defined in section 18-5-502; (H) Concealment or removal of secured property, as defined in section 18-5-504; (I) Failure to pay over proceeds, as defined in section 18-5-505; (J) Unauthorized use of a financial transaction device, as defined in section 18-5-702; (K) Cybercrime, as defined in section 18-5.5-102; (L) Repealed. (M) Trafficking in food stamps, as defined in section 26-2-306, C.R.S.; (N) Unlawful use of a patient personal needs trust fund, as defined in section 25.5-6-206, C.R.S.; (O) Repealed. (P) Theft of a license plate, as described in section 42-5-104; (Q) Theft in connection with assistive technology, as described in section 6-1-409, C.R.S.; (R) Theft of farm products, as described in section 35-36-313; (S) Fraud in connection with obtaining public assistance, as described in section 26-1-127, C.R.S.; (T) Fraud in connection with obtaining food stamps, as described in section 26-2-305, C.R.S.; (U) An offense described in part 1 of article 5 of this title; (V) Forgery, as defined in sections 18-5-102 and 18-5-104; and (W) Identity theft, as defined in section 18-5-902. d in section 35-36-313; (S) Fraud in connection with obtaining public assistance, as described in section 26-1-127, C.R.S.; (T) Fraud in connection with obtaining food stamps, as described in section 26-2-305, C.R.S.; (U) An offense described in part 1 of article 5 of this title; (V) Forgery, as defined in sections 18-5-102 and 18-5-104; and (W) Identity theft, as defined in section 18-5-902. (c) (I) For an indictment or information that includes an offense described in article 5 of this title, the offender may be tried in a county where the offense occurred, in a county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred, or in a county where a bank, savings and loan, credit union, or government agency processed a document or transaction related to the offense. (II) For the purpose of this section, "processed" means to physically handle a document or to make a written or electronic entry in a permanent or temporary record of the transaction, whether the entry is made manually or through automated means. (8) An inchoate offense is committed and the offender may be tried in any county in which any act which is an element of the offense, including formation of the agreement in conspiracy, is committed. (9) When a person in one county solicits, abets, agrees, aids, or attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in another county, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried for the offense in either county, or in any other county in which the principal offense could be tried. (10) When an offense is committed on the boundary line between two counties, or so close thereto as to be difficult to readily ascertain in which county the offense occurred, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried for the offense in either county. (11) Proof of the county in which the offense occurred or which county is the proper place for trial pursuant to this section shall not constitute an element of any offense and need not be proven by the prosecution at trial unless required by the statute defining the offense. Any challenge to the place of trial pursuant to this section shall be made by motion in writing no later than twenty-one days after arraignment, except for good cause shown. The court shall determine any such issue prior to the commencement of the trial and the selection of a jury. If the court finds that trial is not proper in the county in which the charges were filed, the court shall transfer the case to a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the proper county. Failure to challenge the place of trial as provided in this subsection (11) shall constitute a waiver of any objection to the place of trial. Pursuant to section 16-12-102 (2), C.R.S., the prosecution may file an interlocutory appeal of a decision transferring the case to another county. (12) If a person commits the offense of failure to register as a sex offender as provided in section 18-3-412.5, the offense is committed and the offender may be tried in the county in which the offender was released from incarceration for commission of the offense requiring registration, in the county in which the offender resides, in the county in which the offender completed his or her last registration, or in the county in which the offender is apprehended. (13) If a person commits identity theft as described in section 18-5-902, identity theft is committed and the offender may be tried in any county where a prohibited act was committed, in any county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed, or in any county where the victim resides during all or part of the offense. For purposes of this subsection (13), a business entity resides in any county in which it maintains a physical location. in section 18-5-902, identity theft is committed and the offender may be tried in any county where a prohibited act was committed, in any county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed, or in any county where the victim resides during all or part of the offense. For purposes of this subsection (13), a business entity resides in any county in which it maintains a physical location. (14) (a) If a person commits sexual assault on a child as described in section 18-3-405 (1) and commits the offense as part of a pattern of sexual abuse as described in section 18-3-405 (2)(d), or commits sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as described in section 18-3-405.3 (1) and commits the offense as part of a pattern of sexual abuse as described in section 18-3-405.3 (2)(b), the offender may be tried for all acts: (I) In a county where at least one of the acts constituting the offense or the pattern of sexual abuse was committed; or (II) In a county where an act in furtherance of the offense was committed. (b) This subsection (14) takes effect on April 4, 2017, and applies to an act constituting a pattern of sexual abuse for which the offense's statute of limitations has not yet run on April 4, 2017. (c) Nothing in this subsection (14) allows for a defendant to be placed in jeopardy twice for the same incident of sexual conduct involving a child that has been previously alleged as an incident necessary to form a pattern of sexual abuse as defined in section 18-3-401(2.5) in violation of the prohibition against second trials in sections 18-1-301, 18-1-302, and 18-1-303.

C.R.S. § 18-1-301 Second trial barred by former prosecution for same offense

18-1-301. Second trial barred by former prosecution for same offense. (1) If a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of law and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances: (a) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal. There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier of fact or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater inclusive offense even though the conviction is subsequently set aside. (b) The former prosecution was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated, and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the offense. (c) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction that has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty that has not been set aside and that is capable of supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. In the latter two instances, failure to enter judgment must be for a reason other than a motion of the defendant. (d) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the jury is sworn if the case is tried by a jury or after the first prosecution witness is sworn if trial is by court following waiver of jury trial. (2) Termination is not improper under any of the following circumstances: (a) The defendant consents to the termination or waives his right to object to the termination. The defendant is deemed to have waived all objections to a termination of the trial unless his objections to the order of termination are made of record at the time of the entry thereof. (b) The trial court finds that: (I) The termination is necessary because it is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or (II) There is a legal defect in the proceedings that would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or (III) Prejudicial conduct has occurred in or outside the courtroom making it unjust either to the defendant or to the state to proceed with the trial; or (IV) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or (V) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.

C.R.S. § 18-1-302 Second trial barred by former prosecution for different offense

18-1-302. Second trial barred by former prosecution for different offense. (1) Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of law than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances: (a) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction as defined in section 18-1-301 (1)(a) and (1)(c) and the subsequent prosecution is for: (I) Any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted under the allegation of the complaint, information, or indictment of the first prosecution; or (II) The same conduct, unless the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil or the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (b) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the second offense. (c) The former prosecution was improperly terminated, as improper termination is defined in section 18-1-301 (1)(d) and (2), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.

C.R.S. § 18-1-303 Second trial barred by prosecution in another jurisdiction

18-1-303. Second trial barred by prosecution in another jurisdiction. (1) If conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of the United States, or another state, or of a municipality, a prosecution in any other of these jurisdictions is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state under either of the following circumstances: (a) The first prosecution resulted in a conviction or an acquittal as defined in section 18-1-301 (1)(a) and (1)(c), and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless: (I) The offense for which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted requires proof of a fact not required by the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted and the law defining each of the offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or (II) The second offense was not consummated when the former trial began. (b) The former prosecution was terminated by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction of the offense for which the defendant is subsequently prosecuted.

C.R.S. § 18-1-304 Former prosecution not a bar

18-1-304. Former prosecution not a bar. (1) A former prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of sections 18-1-301 to 18-1-303, if the former prosecution: (a) Was before a court that lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense; or (b) Was procured by the defendant without the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting official and with the intent to avoid the sentence that otherwise might be imposed; or (c) Resulted in a judgment of conviction that was set aside, reversed, or vacated upon appeal or in any other subsequent judicial proceeding.

C.R.S. § 18-1-401 Purpose

18-1-401. Purpose. It is the intent of this part 4 to confer upon every person accused of an offense the benefits arising from said part 4 as a matter of substantive right, in implementation of minimum standards of criminal justice within the concept of due process of law.

C.R.S. § 18-1-402 Presumption of innocence

18-1-402. Presumption of innocence. Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. No person shall be convicted of any offense unless his guilt thereof is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

C.R.S. § 18-1-403 Legal assistance and supporting services

18-1-403. Legal assistance and supporting services. All indigent persons who are charged with or held for the commission of a crime are entitled to legal representation and supporting services at state expense, to the extent and in the manner provided for in articles 1 and 2 of title 21, C.R.S.

C.R.S. § 18-1-404 Preliminary hearing or waiver - dispositional hearing

18-1-404. Preliminary hearing or waiver - dispositional hearing. (1) Every person accused of a class 1, 2, or 3 felony or level 1 or level 2 drug felony by direct information or felony complaint has the right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged in the information has been committed by the defendant. In addition, only those persons accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony by direct information or felony complaint which felony requires mandatory sentencing or is a crime of violence as defined in section 18-1.3-406, or is a sexual offense under part 4 of article 3 of this title, shall have the right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged in the information or felony complaint was committed by the defendant. The procedure to be followed in asserting the right to a preliminary hearing, and the time within which demand therefor must be made, as well as the time within which the hearing, if demanded, shall be had, shall be as provided by rule of the supreme court of the state of Colorado. A failure to observe and substantially comply with such rule is a waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing. (2) (a) No person accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony or level 3 or level 4 drug felony by direct information or felony complaint, except those which require mandatory sentencing or which are crimes of violence as defined in section 18-1.3-406, or which are sexual offenses under part 4 of article 3 of this title, shall have the right to demand or receive a preliminary hearing; except that such person shall participate in a dispositional hearing for the purposes of case evaluation and potential resolution. (b) Any defendant accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony or level 3 or level 4 drug felony who is not otherwise entitled to a preliminary hearing pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), may demand and shall receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, if the defendant is in custody; except that, upon motion of either party, the court shall vacate the preliminary hearing if there is a reasonable showing that the defendant has been released from custody prior to the preliminary hearing.

C.R.S. § 18-1-405 Speedy trial - definition

18-1-405. Speedy trial - definition. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial on the issues raised by the complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, he shall be discharged from custody if he has not been admitted to bail, and, whether in custody or on bail, the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode. (2) If trial results in conviction which is reversed on appeal, any new trial must be commenced within six months after the date of the receipt by the trial court of the mandate from the appellate court. (3) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted. (3.5) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date of the defendant's next appearance. (4) If a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the prosecuting attorney requests and is granted a continuance, the time is not thereby extended within which the trial shall be had, as is provided in subsection (1) of this section, unless the defendant in person or by his counsel in open court of record expressly agrees to the continuance or unless the defendant without making an appearance before the court in person or by his counsel files a dated written waiver of his rights to a speedy trial pursuant to this section and files an agreement to the continuance signed by the defendant. The time for trial, in the event of such agreement, is then extended by the number of days intervening between the granting of such continuance and the date to which trial is continued. (5) To be entitled to a dismissal under subsection (1) of this section, the defendant must move for dismissal prior to the commencement of his trial and prior to any pretrial motions which are set for hearing immediately before the trial or prior to the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge or an included offense. Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant's rights under this section. (5.1) If a trial date is offered by the court to a defendant who is represented by counsel and neither the defendant nor his counsel expressly objects to the offered date as being beyond the time within which such trial shall be had pursuant to this section, then the period within which the trial shall be had is extended until such trial date and may be extended further pursuant to any other applicable provisions of this section. (6) In computing the time within which a defendant is brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time are excluded: (a) Any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, or is unable to appear by reason of illness or physical disability, or is under observation or examination at any time after the issue of the defendant's mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised; (b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution; (c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance; e defendant's mental condition, insanity, incompetency, or impaired mental condition is raised; (b) The period of delay caused by an interlocutory appeal whether commenced by the defendant or by the prosecution; (c) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not granting a severance; (d) The period of delay resulting from the voluntary absence or unavailability of the defendant; however, a defendant shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained, or he resists being returned to the state for trial; (e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial; (f) The period of any delay caused at the instance of the defendant; (g) The period of delay not exceeding six months resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, without the consent of the defendant, if: (I) The continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that this evidence will be available at the later date; or (II) The continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time in felony cases to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances of the case and the court enters specific findings with respect to the justification; (h) The period of delay between the new date set for trial following the expiration of the time periods excluded by paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f) of this subsection (6), not to exceed three months; (i) The period of delay between the filing of a motion pursuant to section 18-1-202 (11) and any decision by the court regarding such motion, and if such decision by the court transfers the case to another county, the period of delay until the first appearance of all the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred, and in such event subsection (7) of this section applies; and (j) Repealed. (7) If a trial date has been fixed by the court and the case is subsequently transferred to a court in another county, the period within which trial must be had is extended for an additional three months from the date of the first appearance of all of the parties in a court of appropriate jurisdiction in the county to which the case has been transferred. (8) Repealed.

C.R.S. § 18-1-406 Right to jury trial

18-1-406. Right to jury trial. (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7) of this section, every person accused of a felony has the right to be tried by a jury of twelve whose verdict shall be unanimous. In matters involving misdemeanors, the accused is entitled to be tried by a jury of six. In matters involving petty offenses, the accused has the right to be tried by a jury under the terms and conditions of section 16-10-109, C.R.S. (2) Except as to class 1 felonies, the person accused of a felony or misdemeanor may waive a trial by jury by express written instrument filed of record or by announcement in open court appearing of record. (3) A defendant may not withdraw a voluntary and knowing waiver of trial by jury as a matter of right, but the court, in its discretion, may permit withdrawal of the waiver prior to the commencement of the trial. (4) Except as to class 1 felonies, the defendant in any felony or misdemeanor case may, with the approval of the court, elect, at any time before the swearing in of the jury, or after the swearing in of the jury and before verdict, with the agreement of the district attorney and the approval of the court, to be tried by a number of jurors less than the number to which he would otherwise be entitled. (5) Upon request of the defendant in advance of the commencement of the trial, the defendant shall be furnished with a list of prospective jurors who will be subject to call in the trial. (6) Either the district attorney or the defendant may challenge the array on the ground that there has been a material departure from the requirements of the law governing the selection of jurors, but such challenge shall be made in writing setting forth the particular grounds upon which it is based and shall be filed prior to the swearing in of the jury selected to try the case. (7) Except as to class 1 felonies, with respect to a twelve-person jury, if the court excuses a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, the court in its discretion may allow the remaining eleven jurors to return the jury's verdict.

C.R.S. § 18-1-407 Affirmative defense

18-1-407. Affirmative defense. (1) "Affirmative defense" means that unless the state's evidence raises the issue involving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, shall present some credible evidence on that issue. (2) If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised, then the guilt of the defendant must be established beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue as well as all other elements of the offense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-408 Prosecution of multiple counts for same act

18-1-408. Prosecution of multiple counts for same act. (1) When any conduct of a defendant establishes the commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (5) of this section; or (b) One offense consists only of an attempt to commit the other; or (c) Inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the commission of the offenses; or (d) The offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct; or (e) The offense is defined as a continuing course of conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was uninterrupted, unless the law provides that specific periods or instances of such conduct constitute separate offenses. (2) If the several offenses are actually known to the district attorney at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within the district attorney's judicial district, all such offenses upon which the district attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode. Any offense not thus joined by separate count cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent prosecution; except that, if at the time jeopardy attaches with respect to the first prosecution against the defendant the defendant or counsel for the defendant actually knows of additional pending prosecutions that this subsection (2) requires the district attorney to charge and the defendant or counsel for the defendant fails to object to the prosecution's failure to join the charges, the defendant waives any claim pursuant to this subsection (2) that a subsequent prosecution is prohibited. (3) When two or more offenses are charged as required by subsection (2) of this section and they are supported by identical evidence, the court upon application of the defendant may require the state, at the conclusion of all the evidence, to elect the count upon which the issues shall be tried. If more than one guilty verdict is returned as to any defendant in a prosecution where multiple counts are tried as required by subsection (2) of this section, the sentences imposed shall run concurrently; except that, where multiple victims are involved, the court may, within its discretion, impose consecutive sentences. (4) When a defendant is charged with two or more offenses based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode, the court, on application of either the defendant or the district attorney, may order any such charge to be tried separately, if it is satisfied that justice so requires. (5) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or t may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. (6) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. (7) If the same conduct is defined as criminal in different enactments or in different sections of this code, the offender may be prosecuted under any one or all of the sections or enactments subject to the limitations provided by this section. It is immaterial to the prosecution that one of the enactments or sections characterizes the crime as of lesser degree than another, or provides a lesser penalty than another, or was enacted by the general assembly at a later date than another unless the later section or enactment specifically repeals the earlier. (8) Without the consent of the prosecution, no jury shall be instructed to return a guilty verdict on a lesser offense if any juror remains convinced by the facts and law that the defendant is guilty of a greater offense submitted for the jury's consideration, the retrial of which would be barred by conviction of the lesser offense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-409 Appellate review of sentence for a felony

18-1-409. Appellate review of sentence for a felony. (1) When a sentence is imposed upon any person following a conviction of any felony, other than a class 1 felony in which a death sentence is automatically reviewed pursuant to section 18-1.3-1201 (6) for an offense charged prior to July 1, 2020, or pursuant to section 18-1.3-1302 (6) for an offense charged prior to July 1, 2020, or pursuant to section 18-1.4-102 (6), the person convicted shall have the right to one appellate review of the propriety of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the public interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based; except that, if the sentence is within a range agreed upon by the parties pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant shall not have the right of appellate review of the propriety of the sentence. The procedures employed in the review shall be provided by supreme court rule. (2) No appellate court shall review any sentence which is imposed unless, within forty-nine days from the date of the imposition of sentence, a written notice is filed in the trial court to the effect that review of the sentence will be sought; said notice must state the grounds upon which it is based. (2.1) and (2.2) Repealed. (3) The reviewing court shall have power to affirm the sentence under review, substitute for the sentence under review any penalty that was open to the sentencing court other than granting probation or other conditional release, or remand the case for any further proceedings that could have been conducted prior to the imposition of the sentence under review, and for resentencing on the basis of such further proceedings. No sentence in excess of the one originally imposed shall be given unless matters of aggravation in addition to those known to the court at the time of the original sentence are brought to the attention of the court during the hearing conducted under this section. If the court imposes a sentence in excess of the one first given, it shall specifically identify the additional aggravating facts considered by it in imposing the increased sentence.

C.R.S. § 18-1-409.5 Appellate review of sentence not within the presumptive range

18-1-409.5. Appellate review of sentence not within the presumptive range. (Repealed)

C.R.S. § 18-1-410 Postconviction remedy

18-1-410. Postconviction remedy. (1) Notwithstanding the fact that no review of a conviction of crime was sought by appeal within the time prescribed therefor, or that a judgment of conviction was affirmed upon appeal, every person convicted of a crime is entitled as a matter of right to make applications for postconviction review. Except as otherwise required by subsection (1.5) of this section, an application for postconviction review must, in good faith, allege one or more of the following grounds to justify a hearing thereon: (a) That the conviction was obtained or sentence imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; (b) That the applicant was convicted under a statute that is in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of this state, or that the conduct for which the applicant was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; (c) That the court rendering judgment was without jurisdiction over the person of the applicant or the subject matter; (d) That the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise not in accordance with the sentence authorized by law; (e) That there exists evidence of material facts, not theretofore presented and heard, which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to or learned of by the defendant or his attorney prior to the submission of the issues to the court or jury, and which requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; (f) (I) That there has been significant change in the law, applied to the applicant's conviction or sentence, allowing in the interests of justice retroactive application of the changed legal standard. (II) The ground set forth in this paragraph (f) may not be asserted if, prior to filing for relief pursuant to this paragraph (f), a person has not sought appeal of a conviction within the time prescribed therefor or if a judgment of conviction has been affirmed upon appeal. (g) Any grounds otherwise properly the basis for collateral attack upon a criminal judgment; or (h) That the sentence imposed has been fully served or that there has been unlawful revocation of parole, probation, or conditional release. (1.5) An application for postconviction review in a class 1 felony case where a sentence of death has been imposed shall be limited to claims of newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel; except that, for any sentence of death imposed on or after the date upon which the Colorado supreme court adopts rules implementing the unitary system of review established by part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., any application for postconviction review in such case shall be governed by the provisions of part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S. (2) (a) Except as otherwise required by paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), procedures to be followed in implementation of the right to postconviction remedy shall be as prescribed by rule of the supreme court of the state of Colorado. (b) In any class 1 felony case where a sentence of death has been imposed, the district court shall expeditiously consider an application for postconviction remedy. It is the general assembly's intent that the district court give priority to cases in which a sentence of death has been imposed. (3) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), an appeal of any order by the district court granting or denying postconviction relief in a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed shall be to the Colorado supreme court as provided by section 13-4-102 (1)(h), C.R.S. The procedures to be followed in the implementation of such review shall be in accordance with any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court in response to the legislative intent expressed in section 16-12-101.5 (1), C.R.S. or denying postconviction relief in a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed shall be to the Colorado supreme court as provided by section 13-4-102 (1)(h), C.R.S. The procedures to be followed in the implementation of such review shall be in accordance with any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court in response to the legislative intent expressed in section 16-12-101.5 (1), C.R.S. (b) In any class 1 felony case in which a sentence of death is imposed on or after the date upon which the Colorado supreme court adopts rules implementing the unitary system of review established under part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., the procedures for appealing any order by the district court granting or denying postconviction relief and review by the Colorado supreme court of such order shall be governed by the provisions of part 2 of article 12 of title 16, C.R.S., and by such rules adopted by the supreme court.

C.R.S. § 18-1-410.5 Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas - legislative declaration

18-1-410.5. Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas - legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly finds that: (a) A criminal defendant cannot challenge an unconstitutional guilty plea when that plea has been withdrawn and the underlying charges dismissed following the successful completion of a deferred judgment or the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal in 2010; (b) Based on the statutory language of sections 18-1.3-102 and 18-18-404 (3), together with the written deferred judgment agreement and court colloquy that accompanies such agreements, many noncitizen defendants did not understand that the guilty plea would continue to constitute a conviction for immigration purposes and result in adverse immigration consequences, despite the subsequent withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges upon successful completion of the deferred judgment or dismissal pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3); and (c) In the absence of an appropriate mechanism, many noncitizen defendants have been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to challenge guilty pleas that were entered in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state that resulted in adverse immigration consequences. (2) Notwithstanding the time limitation contained in section 16-5-402, at any time following the withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges upon successful completion of a deferred judgment, or upon the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal, a criminal defendant may challenge the guilty plea on the grounds set forth in subsection (3) of this section. The court in which the guilty plea was originally entered has jurisdiction and authority to decide the motion. (3) A defendant moving to vacate a guilty plea that has already been withdrawn following the successful completion of a deferred judgment or upon the dismissal of charges pursuant to section 18-18-404 (3) prior to its repeal must, in good faith, allege the following: (a) As a result of the guilty plea, the defendant has suffered, is currently suffering, or will suffer, an adverse immigration consequence; and (b) The guilty plea was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state under one or more of the following grounds: (I) The defendant was not informed that the guilty plea would continue to result in adverse immigration consequences despite the subsequent withdrawal of the guilty plea and dismissal of the charges with prejudice; (II) The defendant was not adequately advised of the immigration consequences of the guilty plea; or (III) The guilty plea was constitutionally infirm for any other reason set forth in section 18-1-410 (1). (4) (a) Upon receipt of the motion, the court shall direct the prosecution to respond within twenty-one days or request additional time for good cause shown. If a response is not filed, the motion is deemed unopposed and the court shall grant the motion. If the prosecution opposes the motion, it shall allege, in good faith, the facts upon which it bases its opposition. If the response raises an issue of material fact, the court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (b) Unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will not suffer an immigration consequence or that the guilty plea was constitutionally entered, the court shall grant the motion. ll allege, in good faith, the facts upon which it bases its opposition. If the response raises an issue of material fact, the court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. (b) Unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will not suffer an immigration consequence or that the guilty plea was constitutionally entered, the court shall grant the motion. (c) For claims raised pursuant to subsection (3)(b)(I) of this section, the prosecution can neither raise an issue of material fact to obtain an evidentiary hearing nor defeat a claim at the hearing by relying on written documents, such as a deferred judgment agreement, plea paperwork, or transcript of a court colloquy, unless those documents clearly show that the defendant was informed that the immigration consequences resulting from a guilty plea would remain despite the subsequent withdrawal of that guilty plea and the dismissal of the charges with prejudice. (5) If the defendant succeeds in challenging a guilty plea under subsection (3) of this section, the court shall vacate the guilty plea as constitutionally infirm. The order constitutes an additional independent basis for the vacatur of the guilty plea and does not result in the reinstatement of charges.

C.R.S. § 18-1-410.6 Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas for certain misdemeanor and municipal offenses - legislative declaration

18-1-410.6. Relief from improperly entered guilty pleas for certain misdemeanor and municipal offenses - legislative declaration. (1) The general assembly finds that: (a) Since the Colorado supreme court decision in People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987), noncitizen defendants in Colorado have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel that requires defense counsel who knows the client is a noncitizen to inform itself of relevant immigration law. The United States supreme court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) further held that defense counsel must inform a client of the immigration consequences of a plea. (b) Many noncitizen defendants received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding immigration consequences of a guilty plea; (c) Many pro se noncitizen defendants received inadequate advisements that did not explain that the right to counsel includes the right to be advised of immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Consequently, many pro se noncitizen defendants did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive their right to counsel when entering a guilty plea. (d) Many noncitizen defendants have been unfairly deprived of the opportunity to challenge an unconstitutional guilty plea due to a time limitation contained in section 16-5-402, a municipal ordinance, or a municipal court rule of procedure, despite valid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or an invalid waiver of the right to counsel; and (e) Protecting the constitutional rights of all Coloradans and ensuring that all defendants are treated consistently in their opportunity to affirm their constitutional rights is a matter of statewide concern. (2) Therefore, the general assembly declares that noncitizen defendants must have the opportunity to meaningfully challenge an unconstitutionally entered guilty plea for certain class 1 misdemeanors, class 2 misdemeanors, and municipal offenses. (3) (a) Notwithstanding a limitation contained in section 16-5-402, a municipal ordinance, or a municipal court rule of procedure, at any time following the entry of a guilty plea, a criminal defendant may challenge the guilty plea on the grounds set forth in subsection (4) of this section to a: (I) Class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor that is not defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1) or title 42, and committed before March 1, 2022; or (II) Municipal offense that is not substantially similar to an offense defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1) or title 42, and committed before March 1, 2022. (b) The court in which the guilty plea was originally entered has jurisdiction and authority to decide the motion. (4) A defendant moving to vacate a guilty plea to a class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor, or a municipal offense, must, in good faith, allege the following: (a) As a result of the guilty plea, the defendant has suffered, is currently suffering, or will suffer an adverse immigration consequence; and urt in which the guilty plea was originally entered has jurisdiction and authority to decide the motion. (4) A defendant moving to vacate a guilty plea to a class 1 or class 2 misdemeanor, or a municipal offense, must, in good faith, allege the following: (a) As a result of the guilty plea, the defendant has suffered, is currently suffering, or will suffer an adverse immigration consequence; and (b) The guilty plea was obtained in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of this state on one or more of the following grounds: (I) The defendant was not adequately advised of the adverse immigration consequences of the guilty plea by defense counsel; (II) The defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel because the defendant was not advised that the right to counsel includes the right to be advised regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea; or (III) The guilty plea was constitutionally infirm for any other reason set forth in section 18-1-410 (1)(a) to (1)(d). (5) (a) Upon receipt of the defendant's motion, the prosecution shall respond within sixty-three days or request additional time for good cause shown. If a response is not filed, the defendant's motion is deemed unopposed, and the court shall grant the defendant's motion. If the prosecution opposes the defendant's motion, it shall allege, in good faith, the facts upon which it bases its opposition. If the response raises an issue of material fact, the court shall set the matter for an evidentiary hearing within twenty-one days. (b) Unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will not suffer an adverse immigration consequence or that the guilty plea was constitutionally entered, the court shall grant the defendant's motion. (c) For claims raised pursuant to subsection (4)(b)(II) of this section, the prosecution shall not rely solely on written documents, such as a deferred judgment agreement, plea paperwork, or transcript of a court colloquy, to raise an issue of material fact to obtain an evidentiary hearing or defeat a claim at the hearing unless the documents clearly show that the defendant was informed by the court that the right to counsel included the right to be advised regarding the immigration consequences resulting from a guilty plea and that the defendant then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right. (6) If the defendant succeeds in challenging a guilty plea pursuant to this section, the court shall vacate the guilty plea as constitutionally infirm and set the case for an arraignment.

C.R.S. § 18-1-410.7 Vacating certain criminal convictions for victims of human trafficking

18-1-410.7. Vacating certain criminal convictions for victims of human trafficking. (1) (a) An individual may file a motion with the court where a conviction was obtained against the individual requesting that the conviction be vacated if the underlying offense resulting in the conviction was committed as a result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking. The individual shall serve a copy of the motion on the district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office that obtained the conviction. (b) This section applies to all state and municipal convictions for crimes except for crimes defined in section 24-4.1-302 (1). (c) This section does not apply to a conviction if the individual raised an affirmative defense described in section 18-7-201.3 or 18-3-504 (2.5) at trial and was still convicted after raising the defense. (d) Official documentation is not required for an individual to seek or be granted relief pursuant to this section, but if the individual provides official documentation from a federal, state, local, or tribal government agency indicating that the individual was a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense, the documentation creates a rebuttable presumption that the individual was a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense and is eligible for relief pursuant to this section. (2) The district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office that obtained the conviction must file a response within thirty-five days from receiving a copy of the motion. If the district attorney's office or municipal attorney's office opposes the motion or the court determines a hearing is necessary, the court shall set the motion for hearing. (3) (a) If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the offense was committed as a result of the individual being a victim of human trafficking at the time of the offense, the court shall vacate the conviction. (b) A conviction vacated pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section is deemed vacated due to a substantive defect in the underlying criminal proceedings. (4) Nothing in this section prevents the individual from applying for any other relief allowed by law. (5) (a) If the court issues an order vacating the conviction, the court shall send the order to the Colorado bureau of investigation and the bureau shall remove the conviction from the individual's record. (b) If the court issues an order vacating the conviction pursuant to this section, the individual may petition to have the other related records sealed pursuant to the procedure in section 24-72-707.

C.R.S. § 18-1-411 Postconviction testing of DNA - definitions

18-1-411. Postconviction testing of DNA - definitions. As used in this section and in sections 18-1-412 to 18-1-416, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) Repealed. (2) "Actual or constructive possession" means the biological evidence is maintained or stored on the premises of the law enforcement agency or at another location or facility under the custody or control of the law enforcement agency, including pursuant to an agreement or contract with the law enforcement agency and a third-party service provider, in Colorado or elsewhere. (3) "DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid. (3.3) "Eligible person" means a person convicted of a felony offense in Colorado or adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense in Colorado pursuant to section 16-8-105.5, including a person currently incarcerated; a person on parole or probation for a felony offense; a person subject to sex offender registration pursuant to section 16-22-103; or a person who has completed the sentence imposed for the felony offense. (3.5) "Favorable result" means a result that indicates a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted. (4) "Incarcerated" means physically housed in a department of corrections facility, a private correctional facility under contract with the department of corrections, or a county jail following a felony conviction, or in a juvenile facility following adjudication for an offense that would have been a felony if committed by an adult, or under parole supervision.

C.R.S. § 18-1-412 Procedure for application for DNA testing - appointment of counsel

18-1-412. Procedure for application for DNA testing - appointment of counsel. (1) An eligible person may apply at any time to the district court in the district where the conviction was secured for DNA testing concerning the conviction and sentence. (2) A motion filed pursuant to this section shall include specific facts sufficient to support a prima facie showing that post-conviction relief is warranted under the criteria set forth in section 18-1-413. The motion shall include the results of all prior DNA tests, regardless of whether a test was performed by the defense or the prosecution. (3) If the motion, files, and record of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the criteria specified in section 18-1-413, the court shall deny the motion without a hearing and without appointment of counsel. (4) If the court does not deny the petitioner's motion for testing, the court shall appoint counsel if the court determines the petitioner is indigent and has requested counsel. The court shall forward a copy of the motion for DNA testing to the district attorney. (5) Counsel for the defendant may request the court to set the matter for a hearing, if, upon investigation of the petitioner's motion for testing, counsel believes sufficient grounds exist to support an order for DNA testing. If the petitioner represents himself or herself, the court may set the matter for a hearing upon his or her request. (6) Following a request for a hearing, the court shall allow the district attorney a reasonable amount of time, but not less than thirty-five days, to respond to the motion and any supplement filed by the petitioner's counsel and to prepare for the hearing. (7) A court shall not order DNA testing without a hearing, except upon written stipulation of the district attorney. (8) The court shall deny a motion for production of transcripts unless the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that a transcript will be necessary at a hearing conducted pursuant to this section. (9) Upon motion of the defendant or the defendant's counsel, the court shall order a database search by a law enforcement agency in both national and local databases if the court determines that a reasonable probability exists that the database search will produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing. DNA profiles must meet current national DNA database index system eligibility standards and conform to current federal bureau of investigation quality assurance standards in order to be eligible for search against the state index system.

C.R.S. § 18-1-413 Content of application for DNA testing

18-1-413. Content of application for DNA testing. (1) The court shall order DNA testing if: (a) It finds a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted if favorable results had been obtained through DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution; (b) It finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement agency collected biological evidence pertaining to the offense; (c) (I) It finds by a preponderance of the evidence that DNA results were not available prior to the petitioner's conviction or, if previously available and tested, the evidence can be subjected to more advanced, scientifically reliable DNA testing that provides a reasonable likelihood of more probative results; or (II) The petitioner did not secure the requested DNA testing prior to the petitioner's conviction because DNA testing was not reasonably available or for reasons that constitute justifiable excuse, ineffective assistance of counsel, or excusable neglect; and (d) The petitioner consents to provide a biological sample for DNA testing. (2) A petitioner may only file a subsequent petition with new grounds for relief not raised in the prior petition if the petitioner exercised due diligence to raise all viable claims at the time of the initial petition or if the petitioner was not granted a hearing on the initial petition and the subsequent petition raises viable grounds for relief. If the court determines these criteria are satisfied, the court may consider the subsequent petition if the petitioner establishes good cause why a successive petition should be considered or the court finds that the interests of justice so require. If the court considers the subsequent petition, the court shall determine whether to grant the petition pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

C.R.S. § 18-1-414 Preservation of evidence

18-1-414. Preservation of evidence. (1) A petitioner shall not be entitled to relief based solely on an allegation that a law enforcement agency failed to preserve biological evidence. (2) (a) A court granting a motion for hearing pursuant to section 18-1-412 shall order the appropriate law enforcement agency to preserve existing biological evidence for DNA testing. (b) If a law enforcement agency, through negligence, destroys, loses, or otherwise disposes of biological evidence that is the subject of an order pursuant to this subsection (2) before the evidence may be tested, the court shall set a hearing to determine whether a remedy is warranted. If the court determines that a remedy is warranted, the court may order whatever remedy the court finds is just, equitable, and appropriate. Nothing in this subsection (2) shall be construed to limit or eliminate the court's authority to order any remedy otherwise available under law for the destruction, loss, or disposal of evidence. (c) For the purposes of this subsection (2), "negligence" means a departure from the ordinary standard of care. (d) When a motion for postconviction DNA testing is granted, the primary investigative agency that handled the case shall prepare an inventory of the evidence related to the case and issue a copy of the inventory to the petitioner and the court. (3) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, this section does not create a duty to preserve biological evidence. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, this section does not create a liability on the part of a law enforcement agency for failing to preserve biological evidence.

C.R.S. § 18-1-415 Testing - payment

18-1-415. Testing - payment. If the court orders DNA testing, the testing must be conducted by the Colorado bureau of investigation; except that the court, upon request of the petitioner and after the petitioner establishes good cause, may order testing by another testing laboratory or agency that conforms to the current version of ISO/IEC 17025 requirements, the appropriation quality assurance standards required by the federal bureau of investigation, and forensic-specific requirements and is accredited by an organization that is signatory to the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation Mutual Recognition Arrangements for Testing Laboratories. The petitioner shall pay for the testing. The parties shall consult and negotiate on an agreement on testing methods and techniques. If the parties cannot agree, the court shall designate the testing methods and techniques, considering the totality of the circumstances. In considering the totality of the circumstances, the court shall consider whether the testing would be consumptive in nature, whether the testing would allow for the best possible collection of evidence, and whether the testing would allow for the most probative results to be obtained. If the petitioner is indigent and represented by either the public defender or alternate defense counsel, and with the approval of the public defender or the alternate defense counsel, the costs of the testing shall be paid from the public defender's budget or the alternate defense counsel's budget.

C.R.S. § 18-1-416 Results of the DNA test

18-1-416. Results of the DNA test. (1) Notwithstanding any law or rule of procedure that bars a motion for postconviction review as untimely or successive, a petitioner may use the results of a DNA test ordered pursuant to section 18-1-413 as the grounds for filing a motion for postconviction review pursuant to section 18-1-410 and the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. (1.5) If forensic DNA testing ordered provides a favorable result to the petitioner, the court shall schedule a hearing within thirty days after the result to determine the appropriate relief to be granted. Based on the results of the testing and any evidence or other information presented at the hearing, the court shall enter an order within thirty days after the hearing that serves the interests of justice, including, but not limited to, an order setting aside or vacating the petitioner's judgment of conviction. (2) The testing laboratory shall make the results of a DNA test ordered pursuant to section 18-1-413 available to the combined DNA index system and to any Colorado, federal, or other law enforcement DNA databases. (3) The court shall ensure compliance with the notification procedures and rights afforded to victims provided for in sections 24-4.1-301 to 24-4.1-305.

C.R.S. § 18-1-417 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims - waiver of confidentiality

18-1-417. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims - waiver of confidentiality. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, whenever a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant automatically waives any confidentiality, including attorney-client and work-product privileges, between counsel and defendant, and between the defendant or counsel and any expert witness retained or appointed in connection with the representation, but only with respect to the information that is related to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance. After the defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the allegedly ineffective counsel and an expert witness may discuss with, may disclose any aspect of the representation that is related to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance to, and may produce documents related to such representation that are related to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance to the prosecution without the need for an order by the court that confidentiality has been waived. (2) If the allegedly ineffective counsel or an expert witness has released his or her file or a portion thereof to defendant or defendant's current counsel, defendant or current counsel shall permit the prosecution to inspect and copy any or all portions of the file that are related to the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance upon request of the prosecution.

C.R.S. § 18-1-501 Definitions

18-1-501. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to the determination of culpability requirements for offenses defined in this code: (1) "Act" means a bodily movement, and includes words and possession of property. (2) "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying state of mind or, where relevant, a series of acts or omissions. (3) "Criminal negligence". A person acts with criminal negligence when, through a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. (4) "Culpable mental state" means intentionally, or with intent, or knowingly, or willfully, or recklessly, or with criminal negligence, as these terms are defined in this section. (5) "Intentionally" or "with intent". All offenses defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as "intentionally" or "with intent" are declared to be specific intent offenses. A person acts "intentionally" or "with intent" when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense. It is immaterial to the issue of specific intent whether or not the result actually occurred. (6) "Knowingly" or "willfully". All offenses defined in this code in which the mental culpability requirement is expressed as "knowingly" or "willfully" are declared to be general intent crimes. A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully" with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts "knowingly" or "willfully", with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result. (7) "Omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law. (8) "Recklessly". A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. (9) "Voluntary act" means an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.

C.R.S. § 18-1-502 Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and of mental culpability

18-1-502. Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and of mental culpability. The minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If that conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, the offense is one of "strict liability". If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to any material element of an offense, the offense is one of "mental culpability".

C.R.S. § 18-1-503 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements

18-1-503. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements. (1) When the commission of an offense, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily designated by use of the terms "intentionally", "with intent", "knowingly", "willfully", "recklessly", or "criminal negligence" or by use of the terms "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false" describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. (2) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state. (3) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly or intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

C.R.S. § 18-1-503.5 Principles of criminal culpability

18-1-503.5. Principles of criminal culpability. (1) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child being younger than eighteen years of age and the child was in fact at least fifteen years of age, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the child to be eighteen years of age or older. This affirmative defense shall not be available if the criminality of conduct depends on the defendant being in a position of trust. (2) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child's being younger than eighteen years of age and the child was in fact younger than fifteen years of age, there shall be no defense that the defendant reasonably believed the child was eighteen years of age or older. (3) If the criminality of conduct depends on a child being younger than fifteen years of age, it shall be no defense that the defendant did not know the child's age or that the defendant reasonably believed the child to be fifteen years of age or older.

C.R.S. § 18-1-504 Effect of ignorance or mistake upon culpability

18-1-504. Effect of ignorance or mistake upon culpability. (1) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engaged in that conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless: (a) It negatives the existence of a particular mental state essential to commission of the offense; or (b) The statute defining the offense or a statute relating thereto expressly provides that a factual mistake or the mental state resulting therefrom constitutes a defense or exemption; or (c) The factual mistake or the mental state resulting therefrom is of a kind that supports a defense of justification as defined in sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. (2) A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless the conduct is permitted by one or more of the following: (a) A statute or ordinance binding in this state; (b) An administrative regulation, order, or grant of permission by a body or official authorized and empowered to make such order or grant the permission under the laws of the state of Colorado; (c) An official written interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, made or issued by a public servant, agency, or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility of administering, enforcing, or interpreting a statute, ordinance, regulation, order, or law. If such interpretation is by judicial decision, it must be binding in the state of Colorado. (3) Any defense authorized by this section is an affirmative defense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-505 Consent

18-1-505. Consent. (1) The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is not a defense unless the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (2) When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. (3) Unless otherwise provided by this code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: (a) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or (b) It is given by a person who, by reason of immaturity, behavioral or mental health disorder, or intoxication, is manifestly unable and is known or reasonably should be known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or (c) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or (d) It is induced by force, duress, or deception. (4) Any defense authorized by this section is an affirmative defense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-601 Liability based upon behavior

18-1-601. Liability based upon behavior. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by the behavior of another person for which he is legally accountable as provided in sections 18-1-602 to 18-1-607.

C.R.S. § 18-1-602 Behavior of another

18-1-602. Behavior of another. (1) A person is legally accountable for the behavior of another person if: (a) He is made accountable for the conduct of that person by the statute defining the offense or by specific provision of this code; or (b) He acts with the culpable mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question and he causes an innocent person to engage in such behavior. (2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, "innocent person" includes any person who is not guilty of the offense in question, despite his behavior, because of duress, legal incapacity or exemption, or unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose, or any other factor precluding the mental state sufficient for the commission of the offense in question.

C.R.S. § 18-1-603 Complicity

18-1-603. Complicity. A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-604 Exemptions from liability based upon behavior of another

18-1-604. Exemptions from liability based upon behavior of another. (1) Unless otherwise provided by the statute defining the offense, a person shall not be legally accountable for behavior of another constituting an offense if he is a victim of that offense or the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incidental to its commission. (2) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge under section 18-1-603 if, prior to the commission of the offense, the defendant terminated his effort to promote or facilitate its commission and either gave timely warning to law enforcement authorities or gave timely warning to the intended victim.

C.R.S. § 18-1-605 Liability based on behavior of another - no defense

18-1-605. Liability based on behavior of another - no defense. In any prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability is based upon the behavior of another pursuant to sections 18-1-601 to 18-1-604, it is no defense that the other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the behavior in question or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, or the defendant belongs to a class of persons who by definition of the offense are legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.

C.R.S. § 18-1-606 Criminal liability of business entities - definitions

18-1-606. Criminal liability of business entities - definitions. (1) A business entity is guilty of an offense if: (a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on the business entity by law; or (b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or knowingly tolerated by the governing body or individual authorized to manage the affairs of the business entity or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his or her employment or in behalf of the business entity. (2) As used in this section: (a) "Agent" means any director, officer, or employee of a business entity, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the business entity, and "high managerial agent" means an officer of a business entity or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of the business entity's policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees. (b) "Business entity" means a corporation or other entity that is subject to the provisions of title 7, C.R.S.; foreign corporations qualified to do business in this state pursuant to article 115 of title 7, C.R.S., specifically including federally chartered or authorized financial institutions; a corporation or other entity that is subject to the provisions of title 11, C.R.S.; or a sole proprietorship or other association or group of individuals doing business in the state. (3) Every offense committed by a corporation prior to July 1, 1985, which would be a felony if committed by an individual shall subject the corporation to the payment of a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than fifteen thousand dollars. For such offenses committed on or after July 1, 1985, the corporation shall be subject to the payment of a fine within the presumptive ranges authorized by section 18-1.3-401 (1)(a)(III). Every offense committed by a corporation which would be a misdemeanor, petty offense, or civil infraction if committed by an individual shall subject the corporation to the payment of a fine within the minimum and maximum fines authorized by sections 18-1.3-501 and 18-1.3-503 for the particular offense of which the corporation is convicted. For an offense committed on or after July 1, 2003, a business entity shall be subject to the payment of a fine within the presumptive ranges authorized by section 18-1.3-401 (1)(a)(III). An offense committed by a business entity that would be a misdemeanor, petty offense, or civil infraction if committed by an individual shall subject the business entity to the payment of a fine within the minimum and maximum fines authorized by sections 18-1.3-501 and 18-1.3-503 for the particular offense of which the business entity is convicted.

C.R.S. § 18-1-607 Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct

18-1-607. Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct. A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to occur in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if that conduct were performed or caused by him in his own name or behalf.

C.R.S. § 18-1-701 Execution of public duty

18-1-701. Execution of public duty. (1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of sections 18-1-702 to 18-1-710, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is required or authorized by a provision of law or a judicial decree binding in Colorado. (2) A "provision of law" and a "judicial decree" in subsection (1) of this section mean: (a) Laws defining duties and functions of public servants; (b) Laws defining duties of private citizens to assist public servants in the performance of certain of their functions; (c) Laws governing the execution of legal process; (d) Laws governing the military service and conduct of war; (e) Judgments and orders of court.

C.R.S. § 18-1-702 Choice of evils

18-1-702. Choice of evils. (1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of sections 18-1-703 to 18-1-707, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. (2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. When evidence relating to the defense of justification under this section is offered by the defendant, before it is submitted for the consideration of the jury, the court shall first rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.

C.R.S. § 18-1-703 Use of physical force - special relationships

18-1-703. Use of physical force - special relationships. (1) The use of physical force upon another person that would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances: (a) A parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon the minor or incompetent person when and to the extent it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the minor or incompetent person. (b) A superintendent or other authorized official of a jail, prison, or correctional institution may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use objectively reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order and discipline, but he or she may use deadly physical force only when he or she objectively reasonably believes the inmate poses an immediate threat to the person using deadly force or another person. (c) A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that it is necessary to maintain order and discipline, but he may use deadly physical force only when it is reasonably necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury. (d) A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious bodily injury upon himself may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon that person to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to thwart the result. (e) A duly licensed physician, advanced practice registered nurse, or a person acting under his or her direction, may use reasonable and appropriate physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment that he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient if: (I) The treatment is administered with the consent of the patient, or if the patient is a minor or an incompetent person, with the consent of his parent, guardian, or other person entrusted with his care and supervision; or (II) The treatment is administered in an emergency when the physician or advanced practice registered nurse reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.

C.R.S. § 18-1-704 Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions

18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He or she is the initial aggressor; except that his or her use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he or she withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his or her intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law; or (d) The use of physical force against another is based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including but not limited to under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant. Nothing in this subsection (3)(d) precludes the admission of evidence, which is otherwise admissible, of a victim's or witness's conduct, behavior, or statements. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. (5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Gender identity" and "gender expression" have the same meaning as in section 18-1-901 (3)(h.5). (b) "Intimate relationship" has the same meaning as in section 18-6-800.3. (c) "Sexual orientation" has the same meaning as in section 18-9-121 (5)(b).

C.R.S. § 18-1-704.5 Use of deadly physical force against an intruder

18-1-704.5. Use of deadly physical force against an intruder. (1) The general assembly hereby recognizes that the citizens of Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their own homes. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704, any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant. (3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from criminal prosecution for the use of such force. (4) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force, including deadly physical force, in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from any civil liability for injuries or death resulting from the use of such force. (5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "dwelling" does not include any place of habitation in a detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-211 (4).

C.R.S. § 18-1-705 Use of physical force in defense of premises

18-1-705. Use of physical force in defense of premises. A person in possession or control of any building, realty, or other premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be thereon, is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of an unlawful trespass by the other person in or upon the building, realty, or premises. However, he may use deadly force only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704, or when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the trespasser to commit first degree arson.

C.R.S. § 18-1-706 Use of physical force in defense of property

18-1-706. Use of physical force in defense of property. A person is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other person to commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal tampering involving property, but he may use deadly physical force under these circumstances only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704.

C.R.S. § 18-1-706.5 Justification and exemption from liability when rendering emergency assistance to an at-risk person or animal in a locked vehicle

18-1-706.5. Justification and exemption from liability when rendering emergency assistance to an at-risk person or animal in a locked vehicle. A person is justified and exempt from criminal liability for criminal mischief, criminal trespass, or criminal tampering involving property if such action occurred when he or she rendered emergency assistance to an at-risk person or animal in a locked vehicle, provided the person rendering assistance acted in accordance with the provisions of section 13-21-108.4.

C.R.S. § 18-1-707 Use of force by peace officers - definitions

18-1-707. Use of force by peace officers - definitions. (1) Peace officers, in carrying out their duties, shall apply nonviolent means, when possible, before resorting to the use of physical force. A peace officer may use physical force only if nonviolent means would be ineffective in effecting an arrest, preventing an escape, or preventing an imminent threat of injury to the peace officer or another person. (1.5) (a) Pursuant to section 18-8-805 (1) and (2)(a)(I), peace officers shall not use, direct, or unduly influence the use of ketamine upon another person nor compel, direct, or unduly influence an emergency medical service provider to administer ketamine. If a peace officer violates this prohibition, the district attorney may charge the officer with any crime based on the facts of the case. (b) As used in this subsection (1.5), unless the context otherwise requires, "unduly influence" means the improper use of power or trust in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective. (c) Notwithstanding subsection (1.5)(a) of this section, a peace officer who is also certified as an emergency medical service provider may administer ketamine pursuant to the restrictions set forth in section 25-3.5-209 and when the decision to administer ketamine is based on the emergency medical service provider's training and expertise. (2) When physical force is used, a peace officer shall: (a) Not use deadly physical force to apprehend a person who is suspected of only a minor or nonviolent offense; (b) Use only a degree of force consistent with the minimization of injury to others; (c) Ensure that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any injured or affected persons as soon as practicable; and (d) Ensure that any identified relatives or next of kin of persons who have sustained serious bodily injury or death are notified as soon as practicable. (2.5) (a) A peace officer is prohibited from using a chokehold upon another person. (b) (I) As used in this subsection (2.5), "chokehold" means a method by which a person applies sufficient pressure to a person to make breathing difficult or impossible and includes but is not limited to any pressure to the neck, throat, or windpipe that may prevent or hinder breathing or reduce intake of air. (II) "Chokehold" also means applying pressure to a person's neck on either side of the windpipe, but not to the windpipe itself, to stop the flow of blood to the brain via the carotid arteries. (2.7) (a) As used in this subsection (2.7), unless the context otherwise requires: (I) "Mechanical restraint" means a physical device used to involuntarily restrict the movement of a person or the movement or normal function of a portion of a person's body. (II) "Prone position" means a position in which a person is lying on a solid surface with the person's chest and abdomen positioned downward even if the person's face is turned to the side or the person has one shoulder lifted. (III) "Prone restraint" means a use of physical force, including, but not limited to, the use of a mechanical restraint, in which the person who is being restrained is in a prone position. (IV) "Recovery position" means a position other than a prone position that allows the person to breathe normally. downward even if the person's face is turned to the side or the person has one shoulder lifted. (III) "Prone restraint" means a use of physical force, including, but not limited to, the use of a mechanical restraint, in which the person who is being restrained is in a prone position. (IV) "Recovery position" means a position other than a prone position that allows the person to breathe normally. (b) On or before July 1, 2025, any Colorado law enforcement agency that employs a peace officer required to be certified by the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to section 16-2.5-102, a sheriff, and the Colorado state patrol shall: (I) Adopt written policies and procedures concerning use of the prone position and prone restraint by: (A) Peace officers required to be certified by the P.O.S.T. board pursuant to section 16-2.5-102 employed by a Colorado law enforcement agency; (B) Sheriff's deputies, regardless of P.O.S.T. certification, who are engaged in patrol, arrest, taking suspects into custody, transporting detainees, or who have direct contact with inmates within county or local jails; or (C) Colorado state patrol officers; and (II) Post the adopted policies and procedures on the entity's publicly accessible website, or, if the entity does not have a publicly accessible website, shall make the policy and procedures publicly available upon request. (c) The policies and procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (2.7)(b) of this section must include, but need not be limited to, the following: (I) When and how to request medical aid for use of force involving a prone restraint; (II) When to get medical clearance for use of force involving a prone restraint when there are injuries or complaints of injuries; (III) How and when appropriate medical aid within the scope of a peace officer's training should be rendered for any use of force involving prone restraint; and (IV) How and when to appropriately and safely transition any person placed in a prone position into a recovery position as soon as practicable. (d) Each entity must review policies and procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (2.7)(b) of this section at least every five years to ensure the policies and procedures are updated to include current best practices. (e) Beginning on or before July 1, 2026, each entity required to adopt policies and procedures pursuant to subsection (2.7)(b) of this section shall implement and train its peace officers on the provisions of the policies and procedures adopted pursuant to subsection (2.7)(b) of this section. (f) The P.O.S.T. board, created in section 24-31-302, shall make its training on the use of the prone position available to all law enforcement agencies in the state. (3) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force to make an arrest only when all other means of apprehension are unreasonable given the circumstances and: (a) The arrest is for a felony involving conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly physical force; (b) The suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person; (3) A peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force to make an arrest only when all other means of apprehension are unreasonable given the circumstances and: (a) The arrest is for a felony involving conduct including the use or threatened use of deadly physical force; (b) The suspect poses an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person; (c) The force employed does not create a substantial risk of injury to other persons. (4) A peace officer shall identify himself or herself as a peace officer and give a clear verbal warning of his or her intent to use firearms or other deadly physical force, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, unless to do so would unduly place peace officers at risk of injury or would create a risk of death or injury to other persons. (4.5) Notwithstanding any other provision in this section, a peace officer is justified in using deadly force if the peace officer has an objectively reasonable belief that a lesser degree of force is inadequate and the peace officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving serious bodily injury. (5) Except as provided in subsection (6) of this section, a person who has been directed by a peace officer to assist him to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force to be necessary to carry out the peace officer's direction, unless he knows that the arrest or prospective arrest is not authorized. (6) A person who has been directed to assist a peace officer under circumstances specified in subsection (5) of this section may use deadly physical force to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape only when: (a) He reasonably believes that force to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or (b) He is directed or authorized by the peace officer to use deadly physical force and does not know, if that happens to be the case, that the peace officer himself is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances. (7) A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. (8) A guard or peace officer employed in a detention facility is justified: (a) In using deadly physical force when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner convicted of, charged with, or held for a felony or confined under the maximum security rules of any detention facility as such facility is defined in subsection (9) of this section; (b) In using reasonable and appropriate physical force, but not deadly physical force, in all other circumstances when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be the escape of a prisoner from a detention facility. (9) "Detention facility" as used in subsection (8) of this section means any place maintained for the confinement, pursuant to law, of persons charged with or convicted of an offense, held pursuant to the "Colorado Children's Code", held for extradition, or otherwise confined pursuant to an order of a court. (10) Repealed.

C.R.S. § 18-1-708 Duress

18-1-708. Duress. A person may not be convicted of an offense, other than a class 1 felony, based upon conduct in which he engaged at the direction of another person because of the use or threatened use of unlawful force upon him or upon another person, which force or threatened use thereof a reasonable person in his situation would have been unable to resist. This defense is not available when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is foreseeable that he will be subjected to such force or threatened use thereof. The choice of evils defense, provided in section 18-1-702, shall not be available to a defendant in addition to the defense of duress provided under this section unless separate facts exist which warrant its application.

C.R.S. § 18-1-709 Entrapment

18-1-709. Entrapment. The commission of acts which would otherwise constitute an offense is not criminal if the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement official or other person acting under his direction, seeking to obtain evidence for the purpose of prosecution, and the methods used to obtain that evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the acts would be committed by a person who, but for such inducement, would not have conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced. Merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense is not entrapment even though representations or inducements calculated to overcome the offender's fear of detection are used.

C.R.S. § 18-1-710 Affirmative defense

18-1-710. Affirmative defense. The issues of justification or exemption from criminal liability under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-709 are affirmative defenses.

C.R.S. § 18-1-711 Immunity for persons who suffer or report an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event - definitions - repeal

18-1-711. Immunity for persons who suffer or report an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event - definitions - repeal. (1) A person is immune from arrest and prosecution for an offense described in subsection (3) of this section if: (a) The person reports in good faith an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event to a law enforcement officer, to the 911 system, or to a medical provider, or the person aids or seeks aid for the person who suffered the emergency drug or alcohol overdose; (b) The person remains at the scene of the event until a law enforcement officer or an emergency medical responder arrives or the person remains at the facilities of the medical provider until a law enforcement officer arrives; (c) The person identifies himself or herself to, and cooperates with, the law enforcement officer, emergency medical responder, or medical provider; and (d) The offense arises from the same course of events from which the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event arose. (2) The immunity described in subsection (1) of this section also extends to the person who suffered the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event if all of the conditions of subsection (1) of this section are satisfied. (3) The immunity described in subsection (1) of this section applies to the following criminal offenses: (a) Unlawful possession of a controlled substance, as described in section 18-18-403.5 (2) or (2.5); (b) Unlawful use of a controlled substance, as described in section 18-18-404; (c) If committed on or after March 1, 2020, unlawful possession of two ounces or less of marijuana, as described in section 18-18-406 (5)(a)(I) prior to its repeal in 2021; or more than two ounces of marijuana but not more than six ounces of marijuana or not more than three ounces of marijuana concentrate, as described in section 18-18-406 (4)(c); or more than six ounces of marijuana or more than three ounces of marijuana concentrate, as described in section 18-18-406 (4)(b); (d) Open and public display, consumption, or use of less than two ounces of marijuana, as described in section 18-18-406 (5)(b)(I); (e) Transferring or dispensing two ounces or less of marijuana from one person to another for no consideration, as described in section 18-18-406 (5)(c); (f) Use or possession of synthetic cannabinoids or salvia divinorum, as described in section 18-18-406.1; (g) Possession of drug paraphernalia, as described in section 18-18-428; (h) Illegal possession or consumption of ethyl alcohol or marijuana by an underage person or illegal possession of marijuana paraphernalia by an underage person, as described in section 18-13-122; (i) A violation of section 18-18-405 (2)(a)(III)(A), if the unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, or sale of the material, compound, mixture, or preparation weighs not more than four grams and contains any amount of fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or an analog thereof as described in section 18-18-204 (2)(g); and a by an underage person, as described in section 18-13-122; (i) A violation of section 18-18-405 (2)(a)(III)(A), if the unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, or sale of the material, compound, mixture, or preparation weighs not more than four grams and contains any amount of fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or an analog thereof as described in section 18-18-204 (2)(g); and (j) A violation of section 18-18-405 (2)(d)(II) involving unlawful distribution or transferring. (4) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to prohibit the prosecution of a person for an offense other than an offense listed in subsection (3) of this section or to limit the ability of a district attorney or a law enforcement officer to obtain or use evidence obtained from a report, recording, or any other statement provided pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to investigate and prosecute an offense other than an offense listed in subsection (3) of this section. (5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "emergency drug or alcohol overdose event" means an acute condition including, but not limited to, physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, or death resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance, or of alcohol, or another substance with which a controlled substance or alcohol was combined, and that a layperson would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical assistance. (6) (a) Starting on July 1, 2022, and for three years thereafter, a law enforcement agency that responds to an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event shall report to the district attorney's office in the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction whether an arrest was made as a result of the investigation of an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event or when an arrest was not made pursuant to the provisions of this section. (b) Starting on July 1, 2022, and for three years thereafter, each district attorney's office that receives a report regarding an arrest from law enforcement pursuant to subsection (6)(a) of this section shall prepare a report indicating each instance when a person was not prosecuted for an offense pursuant to this section if the event involved fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or an analog thereof as described in section 18-18-204 (2)(g). If the district attorney prosecutes a person who sought emergency assistance for an emergency drug or alcohol overdose event if the event involved fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or an analog thereof as described in section 18-18-204 (2)(g), the district attorney shall prepare a report detailing the facts and circumstances for the decision that the immunity provisions of subsection (1) of this section did not apply. (c) Each district attorney shall provide the reports collected pursuant to this subsection (6) to the legislative service agencies of the Colorado general assembly for the purpose of a post-enactment review. (d) This subsection (6) is repealed, effective July 1, 2026.

C.R.S. § 18-1-712 Immunity for a person who administers an opioid antagonist during an opioid-related drug overdose event - definitions

18-1-712. Immunity for a person who administers an opioid antagonist during an opioid-related drug overdose event - definitions. (1) Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby encourages the administration and distribution of opioid antagonists, including expired opioid antagonists, by persons and entities, including law enforcement personnel, school district personnel, and health-care providers, for the purpose of saving the lives of people who suffer opioid-related drug overdose events. The general assembly also encourages each person who administers an opioid antagonist to another person to call for emergency medical services immediately. (2) General immunity. (a) A person, other than a health-care provider, is immune from criminal prosecution if the person acts in good faith to: (I) Furnish or administer an opioid antagonist to an individual the person believes to be suffering an opioid-related drug overdose event or to an individual who is in a position to assist the individual at risk of experiencing an opioid-related drug overdose event; or (II) Distribute the opioid antagonist. (b) This subsection (2) also applies to: (I) A person or entity described in section 12-30-110 (1)(a); except that an employee or agent of a school, or an employee or agent of a school district, a district school, the charter school institute, an institute charter school, or a nonpublic school who operates or is on a school bus, must be acting in accordance with section 12-30-110 (1)(b), (2)(b), and (4)(b), and, as applicable, section 22-1-119.1; and (II) A person who acts in good faith to furnish or administer an opioid antagonist in accordance with section 25-20.5-1001. (3) (a) Licensed prescribers and dispensers. An individual who is licensed by the state under title 12 and is permitted by section 12-30-110 or by other applicable law to prescribe or dispense an opioid antagonist is immune from criminal prosecution for: (I) Prescribing or dispensing an opioid antagonist in accordance with the applicable law; or (II) Any outcomes resulting from the eventual administration of the opioid antagonist by a layperson. (b) Repealed. (4) The provisions of this section shall not be interpreted to establish any duty or standard of care in the prescribing, dispensing, or administration of an opioid antagonist. (5) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) Repealed. (b) (I) "Health-care provider" means: (A) A licensed or certified physician, nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or pharmacist; or (B) A health maintenance organization licensed and conducting business in this state. (II) "Health-care provider" does not include a podiatrist, optometrist, dentist, or veterinarian. (c) "Opioid" has the same meaning as "opiate", as set forth in section 18-18-102 (21). (d) "Opioid antagonist" has the same meaning as set forth in section 12-30-110 (7)(d). (e) "Opioid-related drug overdose event" means an acute condition, including a decreased level of consciousness or respiratory depression, that: (I) Results from the consumption or use of a controlled substance or another substance with which a controlled substance was combined; (II) A layperson would reasonably believe to be an opioid-related drug overdose event; and (III) Requires medical assistance.

C.R.S. § 18-1-712.3 Possession of opioid antagonist - insufficient for probable cause

18-1-712.3. Possession of opioid antagonist - insufficient for probable cause. The mere presence of a drug approved by the federal food and drug administration for opioid overdose reversal is not indicative of a crime and shall not be used to support probable cause.

C.R.S. § 18-1-712.5 Immunity for sex workers and persons who are victims of human trafficking for sexual servitude and who suffer or report an assault - definition

18-1-712.5. Immunity for sex workers and persons who are victims of human trafficking for sexual servitude and who suffer or report an assault - definition. (1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, "person" means: (a) A person who is the victim of an offense set forth in subsection (3) of this section; (b) A person who is a victim of human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude pursuant to section 18-3-504; or (c) A witness to an offense set forth in subsection (3) of this section. (2) A person is immune from arrest and prosecution for prostitution as described in section 18-7-201, soliciting for prostitution as described in section 18-7-202, and a prostitute making display as described in section 18-7-207, if the person seeks assistance from a law enforcement officer, the 911 system, or a medical provider and if the evidence for the charge of prostitution, soliciting prostitution, or a prostitute making display was obtained as a result of the person seeking assistance, as a result of the need for assistance, or as a result of the reporting of assistance. This subsection (2) also applies to equivalent municipal charges and arrests. (3) A person who is a victim of one of the following offenses, or a person who witnesses one of the following offenses, qualifies for the immunity from prostitution charges as described in subsection (2) of this section: (a) Murder in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-102; (b) Murder in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-103; (c) Manslaughter, as described in section 18-3-104; (d) Criminally negligent homicide, as described in section 18-3-105; (e) Vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106; (f) Assault in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-202; (g) Assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-203; (h) Assault in the third degree, as described in section 18-3-204; (i) Vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205; (j) Menacing, as described in section 18-3-206; (k) Criminal extortion or aggravated extortion, as described in section 18-3-207; (l) Reckless endangerment, as described in section 18-3-208; (m) First degree kidnapping, as described in section 18-3-301; (n) Second degree kidnapping, as described in section 18-3-302; (o) False imprisonment, as described in section 18-3-303; (p) Enticement of a child, as described in section 18-3-305; (q) Internet luring of a child, as described in section 18-3-306; (r) Sexual assault, as described in section 18-3-402; (s) Unlawful sexual contact, as described in section 18-3-404; (t) Sexual assault on a child, as described in section 18-3-405; (u) Human trafficking for involuntary servitude or human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude, as described in section 18-3-503; (v) Human trafficking for sexual servitude or human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude, as described in section 18-3-504; or (w) Stalking, as described in section 18-3-602. (4) The immunity described in subsection (2) of this section for the offense of prostitution is not grounds for suppression of evidence in other criminal charges. Nothing in this section prohibits the prosecution of a person for offenses other than those listed in subsection (2) of this section, or to limit the ability of a district attorney or law enforcement officer to obtain or use evidence from a report, recording, or any other statement provided pursuant to subsection (2) of this section to prosecute an offense other than those listed in subsection (2) of this section. Nothing in this section prohibits the provision of immunity pursuant to other sections of law, as applicable, including section 18-1-711.

C.R.S. § 18-1-713 Victims of human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude or sexual servitude - affirmative defenses

18-1-713. Victims of human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude or sexual servitude - affirmative defenses. (1) Except as provided in section 18-7-209, it is an affirmative defense to any charge, other than a class 1 felony, if the minor being charged proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was, at the time of the offense: (a) A victim of human trafficking of a minor for involuntary servitude pursuant to section 18-3-503 or human trafficking of a minor for sexual servitude pursuant to section 18-3-504; and (b) Forced or coerced into engaging in the criminal act charged.

C.R.S. § 18-1-714 Protective hearing - victim's, defendant's, or witness's gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation - definitions

18-1-714. Protective hearing - victim's, defendant's, or witness's gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation - definitions. (1) Evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation offered in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence may be admissible only at trial and shall not be admitted in any other proceeding except at a proceeding pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. At trial, evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation offered by any party in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence is presumed to be irrelevant. (2) In any criminal prosecution, if evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is to be offered by any party at trial in relation to an affirmative defense or pursuant to rule 404 of the Colorado rules of evidence, the following procedures shall be followed: (a) A written motion must be made at least thirty-five days prior to trial, unless later for good cause shown, to the court and to the opposing parties stating that the moving party has an offer of proof of the specific factual relevancy and materiality of evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or a witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation; (b) The written motion must be accompanied by an affidavit in which the offer of proof is stated; (c) If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall notify the other parties. If the prosecution stipulates to the facts contained in the offer of proof, the court shall rule on the motion based upon the offer of proof without an evidentiary hearing. Otherwise, the court shall set an in-camera hearing prior to trial. In the hearing, to the extent the facts are in dispute, the court may allow a presentation of the offer of proof, including but not limited to the presentation of witnesses. (d) An in-camera hearing may be held during trial if evidence first becomes available at the time of the trial or for good cause shown; (e) At the conclusion of the hearing, or by written order if no hearing is held, if the court finds that the evidence proposed to be offered regarding a victim's, defendant's, or a witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is relevant to a material issue to the case, the court shall order that evidence may be introduced and prescribe the nature of the evidence or questions to be permitted. The moving party may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court. (f) All motions and supporting documents filed pursuant to this section must be filed under seal and may be unsealed only if the court rules the evidence is admissible and the case proceeds to trial. If the court determines that only part of the evidence contained in the motion is admissible, only that portion of the motion and supporting documents pertaining to the admissible portion may be unsealed. All motions and supporting documents filed pursuant to this section must be filed under seal and may be unsealed only if the court rules the evidence is admissible and the case proceeds to trial. If the court determines that only part of the evidence contained in the motion is admissible, only that portion of the motion and supporting documents pertaining to the admissible portion may be unsealed. (g) The court shall seal all court transcripts, digital or other recordings, and records of proceedings, other than minute orders, of a hearing held pursuant to this section. The court may unseal the transcripts, digital or other recordings, and records only if the court rules the evidence is admissible and the case proceeds to trial. If the court determines that only part of the evidence is admissible, only the portion of the hearing pertaining to the admissible evidence may be unsealed. (3) (a) In any criminal prosecution, the court may, at any time upon motion of the prosecution or on the court's own motion, issue a protective order pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure concerning disclosure of information relating to the victim or witness. The court may, at any time upon motion of the defendant or on the court's own motion, issue a protective order pursuant to the Colorado rules of criminal procedure concerning disclosure of information relating to the defendant. The court may punish a violation of a protective order by contempt of court. (b) The person who would be the subject of the protective order may object to the motion for a protective order. (4) If evidence of a victim's, defendant's, or witness's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is admitted at trial, the court shall instruct the jury to not allow bias or any kind of prejudice based upon gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation to influence its decision. If admitted for a limited purpose, the court shall further instruct the jury as to the limited purpose or purposes for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it. (5) This section does not apply when evidence of a victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation is offered in a criminal prosecution for a bias-motivated crime as described in section 18-9-121. In such prosecutions, the rules of evidence shall govern the admissibility of evidence of a victim's actual or perceived gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation. (6) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "Gender identity" and "gender expression" have the same meaning as in section 18-1-901 (3)(h.5). (b) "Intimate relationship" has the same meaning as in section 18-6-800.3. (c) "Sexual orientation" has the same meaning as in section 18-9-121 (5)(b).

C.R.S. § 18-1-801 Insufficient age

18-1-801. Insufficient age. The responsibility of a person for his conduct is the same for persons between the ages of ten and eighteen as it is for persons over eighteen except to the extent that responsibility is modified by the provisions of the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S. No child under ten years of age shall be found guilty of any offense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-802 Insanity

18-1-802. Insanity. (1) (a) A person who is insane, as defined in section 16-8-101, C.R.S., is not responsible for his or her conduct defined as criminal. Insanity as a defense shall not be an issue in any prosecution unless it is raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as provided in section 16-8-103, C.R.S. (b) This subsection (1) applies to offenses committed before July 1, 1995. (2) (a) A person who is insane, as defined in section 16-8-101.5, C.R.S., is not responsible for his or her conduct defined as criminal. Insanity as a defense shall not be an issue in any prosecution unless it is raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity as provided in section 16-8-103, C.R.S. (b) This subsection (2) shall apply to offenses occurring on or after July 1, 1995.

C.R.S. § 18-1-803 Impaired mental condition

18-1-803. Impaired mental condition. (1) Evidence of an impaired mental condition, as defined in section 16-8-102 (2.7), C.R.S., though not legal insanity may be offered in a proper case as bearing upon the capacity of the accused to form the culpable mental state which is an element of the offense charged. (2) An intention to assert the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition shall be made pursuant to section 16-8-103.5, C.R.S. (3) When the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition has been raised, the jury will be given special verdict forms containing interrogatories. The trier of fact shall decide first the question of guilt as to felony charges which are before the court. If the trier of fact concludes that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to one or more of the felony charges submitted for consideration, the special interrogatories shall not be answered. Upon completion of its deliberations on the felony charges as previously set forth in this subsection (3), the trier of fact shall consider any other charges before the court in a similar manner; except that it shall not answer the special interrogatories regarding such charges if it has previously found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to one or more felony charges. The interrogatories shall provide for specific findings of the jury with respect to the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition in accordance with the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. When the court sits as the trier of fact, it shall enter appropriate specific findings with respect to the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition. If the trier of fact finds that the defendant is not guilty by reason of the affirmative defense of impaired mental condition, the court shall commit the defendant to the department of human services pursuant to section 16-8-103.5 (5), C.R.S. (4) This section shall apply to offenses committed before July 1, 1995.

C.R.S. § 18-1-804 Intoxication

18-1-804. Intoxication. (1) Intoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge, except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant when it is relevant to negative the existence of a specific intent if such intent is an element of the crime charged. (2) Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of section 18-1-802. (3) A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if, by reason of intoxication that is not self-induced at the time he acts, he lacks capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. (4) "Intoxication", as used in this section means a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body. (5) "Self-induced intoxication" means intoxication caused by substances which the defendant knows or ought to know have the tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly introduced or allowed to be introduced into his body, unless they were introduced pursuant to medical advice or under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of crime.

C.R.S. § 18-1-805 Responsibility - affirmative defense

18-1-805. Responsibility - affirmative defense. The issue of responsibility under sections 18-1-801 to 18-1-804 is an affirmative defense.

C.R.S. § 18-1-901 Definitions

18-1-901. Definitions. (1) Definitions set forth in any section of this title apply wherever the same term is used in the same sense in another section of this title unless the definition is specifically limited or the context indicates that it is inapplicable. (2) The terms defined in section 18-1-104 and in section 18-1-501, as well as the terms defined in subsection (3) of this section, are terms which appear in various articles of this code. Other terms which need definition but which are used only in a limited number of sections of this code are defined in the particular section or article in which the terms appear. (3) (a) "To aid" or "to assist" includes knowingly to give or lend money or extend credit to be used for, or to make possible or available, or to further the activity thus aided or assisted. (b) "Benefit" means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary including any gain or advantage to another person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary. (c) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition. (d) "Deadly physical force" means force, the intended, natural, and probable consequence of which is to produce death, and which does, in fact, produce death. (e) "Deadly weapon" means: (I) A firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; or (II) A knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. (III) and (IV) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2013.) (f) "Deface" means to alter the appearance of something by removing, distorting, adding to, or covering all or a part of the thing. (g) "Dwelling" means a building which is used, intended to be used, or usually used by a person for habitation. (h) "Firearm" means any handgun, automatic, revolver, pistol, rifle, shotgun, or other instrument or device capable or intended to be capable of discharging bullets, cartridges, or other explosive charges. (h.5) "Gender identity" and "gender expression" mean a person's gender-related identity and gender-related appearance or behavior whether or not that gender-related identity, appearance, or behavior is associated with the person's assigned sex at birth. (i) "Government" includes the United States, any state, county, municipality, or other political unit, any branch, department, agency, or subdivision of any of the foregoing, and any corporation or other entity established by law to carry out any governmental function. (j) "Governmental function" includes any activity which a public servant is legally authorized to undertake on behalf of government. (k) "Motor vehicle" includes any self-propelled device by which persons or property may be moved, carried, or transported from one place to another by land, water, or air, except devices operated on rails, tracks, or cables fixed to the ground or supported by pylons, towers, or other structures. (l) Repealed. (m) "Pecuniary benefit" means benefit in the form of money, property, commercial interests, or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain. (n) "Public place" means a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities. ey, property, commercial interests, or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic gain. (n) "Public place" means a place to which the public or a substantial number of the public has access, and includes but is not limited to highways, transportation facilities, schools, places of amusement, parks, playgrounds, and the common areas of public and private buildings and facilities. (o) "Public servant" means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses. (o.5) "Restorative justice practices" means practices that emphasize repairing the harm caused to victims and the community by offenses. Restorative justice practices include victim-offender conferences, family group conferences, circles, community conferences, and other similar victim-centered practices. Restorative justice practices are facilitated meetings attended voluntarily by the victim or victim's representatives, the victim's supporters, the offender, and the offender's supporters and may include community members. By engaging the parties to the offense in voluntary dialogue, restorative justice practices provide an opportunity for the offender to accept responsibility for the harm caused to the victim and community, promote victim healing, and enable the participants to agree on consequences to repair the harm, to the extent possible, including but not limited to apologies, community service, reparation, restoration, and counseling. Restorative justice practices may be used in addition to any other conditions, consequences, or sentence imposed by the court. (p) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that, either at the time of the actual injury or at a later time, involves a substantial risk of death; a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement; a substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part or organ of the body; or breaks, fractures, a penetrating knife or penetrating gunshot wound, or burns of the second or third degree. (q) "Tamper" means to interfere with something improperly, to meddle with it, or to make unwarranted alterations in its condition. (r) "Thing of value" includes real property, tangible and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses in action, services, confidential information, medical records information, and any rights of use or enjoyment connected therewith. (r.5) "Transgender identity" means identity based on an individual's gender identity or expression being different from that typically associated with their sex at birth. (s) "Utility" means an enterprise which provides gas, sewer, electric, steam, water, transportation, or communication services, and includes any carrier, pipeline, transmitter, or source, whether publicly or privately owned or operated.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1001 Protection order against defendant - definitions

18-1-1001. Protection order against defendant - definitions. (1) There is created a mandatory protection order against any person charged with a criminal violation of any of the provisions of this title 18, which order remains in effect from the time that the person is advised of the person's rights at arraignment or the person's first appearance before the court and informed of such order until final disposition of the action. Such order restrains the person charged from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts charged. The protection order issued pursuant to this section must be on a standardized form prescribed by the judicial department, and a copy provided to the protected parties. (2) At the time of arraignment or the person's first appearance before the court, the court shall inform the defendant of the protection order effective pursuant to this section and shall inform the defendant that a violation of such order is punishable by contempt. (3) (a) Nothing in this section precludes the defendant from applying to the court at any time for modification or dismissal of the protection order issued pursuant to this section or the district attorney from applying to the court at any time for further orders, additional provisions under the protection order, or modification or dismissal of the same. The trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or dismiss the protection order until final disposition of the action. Upon motion of the district attorney or on the court's own motion for the protection of the alleged victim or witness, the court may, in cases involving domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1) and cases involving crimes listed in section 24-4.1-302, except those listed in subsections (1)(cc.5) and (1)(cc.6) of that section, enter any of the following further orders against the defendant: (I) An order to vacate or stay away from the home of the alleged victim or witness and to stay away from any other location where the victim or witness is likely to be found; (II) An order to refrain from contact or direct or indirect communication with the alleged victim or witness; (III) An order prohibiting possession or control of firearms or other weapons; (IV) An order prohibiting possession or consumption of alcohol or controlled substances; (V) An order prohibiting the taking, transferring, concealing, harming, disposing of, or threatening to harm an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by an alleged victim or witness; and (VI) Any other order the court deems appropriate to protect the safety of the alleged victim or witness. (b) Any further orders issued pursuant to subsection (3)(a) of this section are for the protection of a victim or witness and not for the protection of the defendant, including for the protection of the defendant from the use of alcohol or other substances. (4) Any person failing to comply with a protection order issued pursuant to this section commits the crime of violation of a protection order and may be punished as provided in section 18-6-803.5. )(a) of this section are for the protection of a victim or witness and not for the protection of the defendant, including for the protection of the defendant from the use of alcohol or other substances. (4) Any person failing to comply with a protection order issued pursuant to this section commits the crime of violation of a protection order and may be punished as provided in section 18-6-803.5. (5) Before a defendant is released on bail pursuant to article 4 of title 16, C.R.S., the court shall, in cases involving domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), in cases of stalking pursuant to section 18-3-602, or in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S., state the terms of the protection order issued pursuant to this section, including any additional provisions added pursuant to subsection (3) of this section, to the defendant on the record, and the court shall further require the defendant to acknowledge the protection order in court and in writing prior to release as a condition of any bond for the release of the defendant. The prosecuting attorney shall, in such domestic violence cases, stalking cases, or in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S., notify the alleged victim, the complainant, and the protected person of the order if such persons are not present at the time the protection order is issued. (6) The defendant or, in cases involving domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), in cases of stalking pursuant to section 18-3-602, or in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), C.R.S., the prosecuting attorney may request a hearing before the court to modify the terms of a protection order issued pursuant to this section. Upon such a request, the court shall set a hearing and the prosecuting attorney shall send notice of the hearing to the defendant and the alleged victim. At the hearing the court shall review the terms of the protection order and any further orders entered and shall consider the modifications, if any, requested by the defendant or the prosecuting attorney. (7) The duties of peace officers enforcing orders issued pursuant to this section shall be in accordance with section 18-6-803.5 and any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court pursuant to said section. (8) For purposes of this section: (a) "Court" means the trial court or a designee of the trial court. (a.5) "Protection order" shall include a restraining order entered pursuant to this section prior to July 1, 2003. (b) "Until final disposition of the action" means until the case is dismissed, until the defendant is acquitted, until the defendant completes the defendant's sentence, or until the defendant's commitment is terminated and the defendant is discharged from supervision following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to section 16-8-115. Any defendant sentenced to probation is deemed to have completed the defendant's sentence upon discharge from probation. A defendant sentenced to incarceration is deemed to have completed the defendant's sentence upon release from incarceration and discharge from parole supervision. is discharged from supervision following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity pursuant to section 16-8-115. Any defendant sentenced to probation is deemed to have completed the defendant's sentence upon discharge from probation. A defendant sentenced to incarceration is deemed to have completed the defendant's sentence upon release from incarceration and discharge from parole supervision. (9) (a) Order requirements. When the court subjects a defendant to a mandatory protection order that the court, using the probable cause standard of review, determines on the record after reviewing the probable cause statement or arrest warrant that the order includes a crime that includes an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), and the act of domestic violence involved the threat of use, use of, or attempted use of physical force, the court, as part of such order: (I) Shall order the defendant to: (A) Refrain from possessing or purchasing any firearm or ammunition for the duration of the order; and (B) Relinquish, for the duration of the order, any firearm or ammunition in the defendant's immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant's immediate possession or control; and (II) May require that before the defendant is released from custody on bond, the defendant relinquish, for the duration of the order, any firearm or ammunition in the defendant's immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant's immediate possession or control; and (III) Shall schedule a compliance hearing pursuant to subsection (9)(e) of this section and notify the defendant of the hearing date and that the defendant shall appear at the hearing in person unless the hearing is vacated pursuant to subsection (9)(e)(I) of this section. (b) Time period to relinquish. Upon issuance of an order pursuant to subsection (9)(a) of this section, the defendant shall relinquish, in accordance with subsection (9)(d) of this section, any firearm or ammunition not more than twenty-four hours, excluding legal holidays and weekends, after being served with the order; except that a court may allow a defendant additional time based on a showing of good cause to relinquish a firearm if the defendant demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is unable to comply within the time frame set forth in this subsection (9)(b). (c) Additional time to comply if defendant is in custody. If a defendant is unable to satisfy the provisions of this subsection (9) because the defendant is incarcerated or otherwise held in the custody of a law enforcement agency, the court shall require the defendant to satisfy the provisions of this subsection (9) not more than twenty-four hours, excluding legal holidays and weekends, after the defendant's release from incarceration or custody or be held in contempt of court. Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (9)(c), the court may, in its discretion, require the defendant to relinquish any firearm or ammunition in the defendant's immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant's immediate possession or control before the end of the defendant's incarceration or release from custody. In such a case, a defendant's failure to relinquish a firearm or ammunition as required constitutes contempt of court. the court may, in its discretion, require the defendant to relinquish any firearm or ammunition in the defendant's immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant's immediate possession or control before the end of the defendant's incarceration or release from custody. In such a case, a defendant's failure to relinquish a firearm or ammunition as required constitutes contempt of court. (d) Relinquishment options. To satisfy the requirement in subsection (9)(b) of this section, the defendant shall either: (I) Sell or transfer possession of the firearm or ammunition to a federally licensed firearms dealer described in 18 U.S.C. sec. 923, as amended; except that this provision must not be interpreted to require any federally licensed firearms dealer to purchase or accept possession of any firearm or ammunition; or (II) Arrange for the storage of the firearm or ammunition by a law enforcement agency or by a storage facility with which the law enforcement agency has contracted for the storage of transferred firearms or ammunition, pursuant to subsection (9)(g) of this section; except that this provision must not be interpreted to require any law enforcement agency to provide storage of firearms or ammunition for any person; or (III) Sell or otherwise transfer the firearm or ammunition to a private party who may legally possess the firearm or ammunition; except that a defendant who sells or transfers a firearm pursuant to this subsection (9)(d)(III) shall satisfy all of the provisions of section 18-12-112 concerning private firearms transfers, including but not limited to the performance of a criminal background check of the transferee. (e) Compliance hearing, conditions of release on bond, and affidavit. (I) The court shall conduct a compliance hearing to ensure the defendant has complied with this subsection (9) by requiring the defendant to comply with subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. The court may consider the issue in other proceedings before the court in the criminal case. The hearing is considered a court action involving a bond reduction or modification as described in section 24-4.1-302 (2)(c). A defendant shall comply with section 16-4-105 (4.1) as it relates to the conditions of release on bond. The court may vacate the hearing if the court determines that the defendant has completed the affidavit described in subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. Failure to appear at a hearing described in this subsection (9)(e)(I) constitutes contempt of court. (II) The defendant shall complete an affidavit, which must be filed in the court record within seven business days after the order is issued, stating the number of firearms in the defendant's immediate possession or control or subject to the defendant's immediate possession or control, the make and model of each firearm, any reason the defendant is still in immediate possession or control of such firearm, and the location of each firearm. If the defendant does not possess a firearm at the time the order is issued pursuant to subsection (9)(a) of this section, the defendant shall indicate such nonpossession in the affidavit. (III) If the defendant possessed a firearm at the time of the qualifying incident giving rise to the duty to relinquish the firearm pursuant to this subsection (9) but transferred or sold the firearm to a private party prior to the court's issuance of the order, the defendant shall disclose the sale or transfer of the firearm to the private party in the affidavit described in subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. The defendant, within seven business days after the relinquishment period established by the court pursuant to this subsection (9), shall acquire a written receipt and signed declaration that complies with subsection (9)(h)(I)(A) of this section, and the defendant shall file the signed declaration at the same time the defendant files the affidavit pursuant to subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. The defendant, within seven business days after the relinquishment period established by the court pursuant to this subsection (9), shall acquire a written receipt and signed declaration that complies with subsection (9)(h)(I)(A) of this section, and the defendant shall file the signed declaration at the same time the defendant files the affidavit pursuant to subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. (IV) No testimony or other information compelled pursuant to this subsection (9), or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information, may be used against the defendant in any criminal case, except prosecution for perjury pursuant to section 18-8-503. (V) The state court administrator shall develop the affidavit described in subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section and all other forms necessary to implement this subsection (9) no later than January 1, 2022. State courts may use the forms developed by the state court administrator pursuant to this subsection (9)(e) or another form of the court's choosing, so long as the forms comply with the requirements of this subsection (9)(e). (VI) Upon the sworn statement or testimony of the petitioner or of any law enforcement officer alleging there is probable cause to believe the respondent has failed to comply with the provisions of this section, the court shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the respondent has failed to relinquish all firearms or a concealed carry permit in the respondent's custody, control, or possession. If probable cause exists, the court shall issue a search warrant that states with particularity the places to be searched and the items to be taken into custody. (f) Relinquishment to a federally licensed firearms dealer. A federally licensed firearms dealer who takes possession of a firearm or ammunition pursuant to this subsection (9) shall issue a written receipt and signed declaration to the defendant at the time of relinquishment. The declaration must memorialize the sale or transfer of the firearm. The federally licensed firearms dealer shall not return the firearm or ammunition to the defendant unless the dealer: (I) Contacts the Colorado bureau of investigation, referred to in this subsection (9) as the "bureau", to request that a criminal background check of the defendant be performed; and (II) Obtains approval of the transfer from the bureau after the performance of the criminal background check. (g) Storage by a law enforcement agency or storage facility. (I) A local law enforcement agency may elect to store firearms or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9). The law enforcement agency may enter into an agreement with any other law enforcement agency or storage facility for the storage of transferred firearms or ammunition. If a law enforcement agency elects to store firearms or ammunition for a defendant: (A) The law enforcement agency may charge a fee for the storage, the amount of which must not exceed the direct and indirect costs incurred by the law enforcement agency in providing the storage; (B) The law enforcement agency shall establish policies for disposal of abandoned or stolen firearms or ammunition; and (C) The law enforcement agency shall issue a written receipt and signed declaration to the defendant at the time of relinquishment. The declaration must memorialize the sale or transfer of the firearm. (II) If a local law enforcement agency elects to store firearms or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9)(g), the law enforcement agency shall not return the firearm or ammunition to the defendant unless the law enforcement agency: (A) Contacts the bureau to request that a criminal background check of the defendant be performed; and (B) Obtains approval of the transfer from the bureau after the performance of the criminal background check. r ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9)(g), the law enforcement agency shall not return the firearm or ammunition to the defendant unless the law enforcement agency: (A) Contacts the bureau to request that a criminal background check of the defendant be performed; and (B) Obtains approval of the transfer from the bureau after the performance of the criminal background check. (III) (A) A law enforcement agency that elects to store a firearm or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9) may elect to cease storing the firearm or ammunition. A law enforcement agency that elects to cease storing a firearm or ammunition for a defendant shall notify the defendant of the decision and request that the defendant immediately make arrangements for the transfer of the possession of the firearm or ammunition to the defendant or, if the defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm, to another person who is legally permitted to possess a firearm. (B) If a law enforcement agency elects to cease storing a firearm or ammunition for a defendant and notifies the defendant as described in subsection (9)(g)(III)(A) of this section, the law enforcement agency may dispose of the firearm or ammunition if the defendant fails to make arrangements for the transfer of the firearm or ammunition and complete the transfer within ninety days after receiving the notification. (IV) A law enforcement agency that elects to store a firearm or ammunition shall obtain a search warrant to examine or test the firearm or ammunition or facilitate a criminal investigation if a law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe the firearm or ammunition has been used in the commission of a crime, is stolen, or is contraband. This subsection (9)(g)(IV) does not preclude a law enforcement agency from conducting a routine inspection of the firearm or ammunition prior to accepting the firearm for storage. (h) Relinquishment to a private party. (I) If a defendant sells or otherwise transfers a firearm or ammunition to a private party who may legally possess the firearm or ammunition, as described in subsection (9)(d)(III) of this section, the defendant shall acquire: (A) From the federally licensed firearms dealer, a written receipt and signed declaration memorializing the transfer, which receipt must be dated and signed by the defendant, the transferee, and the federally licensed firearms dealer; and (B) From the federally licensed firearms dealer who requests from the bureau a criminal background check of the transferee, as described in section 18-12-112, a written statement of the results of the criminal background check. (II) The defendant shall not transfer the firearm to a private party living in the same residence as the defendant at the time of the transfer. (III) Notwithstanding section 18-12-112, if a private party elects to store a firearm for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9), the private party shall not return the firearm to the defendant unless the private party acquires from the federally licensed firearms dealer who requests from the bureau a criminal background check of the defendant, a written statement of the results of the background check authorizing the return of the firearm to the defendant. to store a firearm for a defendant pursuant to this subsection (9), the private party shall not return the firearm to the defendant unless the private party acquires from the federally licensed firearms dealer who requests from the bureau a criminal background check of the defendant, a written statement of the results of the background check authorizing the return of the firearm to the defendant. (i) Requirement to file signed declaration. (I) The defendant shall file a copy of the signed declaration issued pursuant to subsection (9)(f), (9)(g)(I)(C), or (9)(h)(I)(A) of this section, and, if applicable, the written statement of the results of a criminal background check performed on the defendant, as described in subsection (9)(h)(I)(B) of this section, with the court as proof of the relinquishment at the same time the defendant files the signed affidavit pursuant to subsection (9)(e)(II) of this section. The signed declaration and written statement filed pursuant to this subsection (9)(i) are only available for inspection by the court and the parties to the proceeding. If a defendant fails to timely transfer or sell a firearm or file the signed declaration or written statement as described in this subsection (9)(i)(I): (A) The failure constitutes a violation of the protection order pursuant to section 18-6-803.5 (1)(c); and (B) The court shall issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest. (II) In any subsequent prosecution for a violation of a protection order described in this subsection (9)(i), the court shall take judicial notice of the defendant's failure to transfer or sell a firearm, or file the signed declaration or written statement, which constitutes prima facie evidence of a violation of the protection order pursuant to section 18-6-803.5 (1)(c), and testimony of the clerk of the court or the clerk of the court's deputy is not required. (j) Nothing in this subsection (9) limits a defendant's right to petition the court for dismissal of a protection order. (k) A defendant subject to a mandatory protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (9) who possesses or attempts to purchase or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protection order is in effect violates the order pursuant to section 18-6-803.5 (1)(c). (l) (I) A law enforcement agency that elects in good faith to not store a firearm or ammunition for a defendant pursuant to subsection (9)(g) of this section is not criminally or civilly liable for such inaction. (II) A law enforcement agency that returns possession of a firearm or ammunition to a defendant in good faith as permitted by subsection (9)(g) of this section is not criminally or civilly liable for such action. (m) Immunity. A federally licensed firearms dealer, law enforcement agency, storage facility, or private party that elects to store a firearm pursuant to this subsection (9) is not civilly liable for any resulting damages to the firearm, as long as such damage did not result from the willful and wrongful act or gross negligence of the federally licensed firearms dealer, law enforcement agency, storage facility, or private party. (10) The issuance of a protection order pursuant to this section does not preclude a court from issuing a protective order in a civil proceeding.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1001.5 Protection order against defendant - transfer of wireless telephone service in domestic violence cases - definitions

18-1-1001.5. Protection order against defendant - transfer of wireless telephone service in domestic violence cases - definitions. (1) In addition to the options described in section 18-1-1001 (3), upon a discretionary motion of the district attorney or on the court's own motion for the protection of an alleged victim or witness in a case involving domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), and cases involving crimes listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1), except those listed in subsections (1)(cc.5) and (1)(cc.6) of that section, the court may enter an order directing a wireless telephone service provider to transfer the financial responsibility for and rights to a wireless telephone number or numbers to the alleged victim or witness if the alleged victim or witness: (a) Is not the account holder; and (b) Proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged victim or witness and any minor children in his or her care are the primary users of each wireless telephone number that will be ordered to be transferred by a court pursuant to this section. (2) (a) An order transferring the financial responsibility for and rights to a wireless telephone number or numbers to an alleged victim or witness pursuant to this section must be a separate written order that is directed to the wireless telephone service provider. (b) The order must list the name and billing telephone number of the account holder, the name and contact information of the alleged victim or witness to whom the telephone number or numbers will be transferred, and each telephone number to be transferred to the alleged victim or witness. (c) The court shall ensure that the alleged victim's or witness's contact information is not provided to the account holder in proceedings held pursuant to this section. (d) The order must be sent or delivered in person or electronically by the protected party to the wireless telephone service provider's registered agent. (e) A wireless telephone service provider shall terminate the account holder's use of a telephone number that the court has ordered to be transferred to the alleged victim or witness pursuant to this section unless the wireless telephone service provider notifies the alleged victim or witness and the court within five business days after the wireless telephone service provider receives the order either that an account holder named in the order has terminated the account or that the requested transfer cannot be effectuated due to differences in network technology that prevent functionality of a device on the network or due to geographic limitations on network or service availability. (3) A transfer ordered pursuant to this section does not preclude a wireless telephone service provider from applying any routine and customary requirements for account establishment to the alleged victim or witness as part of the transfer of financial responsibility for a wireless telephone number or numbers and any devices attached to the number or numbers, including, without limitation, identification, financial information, and customer preferences. (4) A wireless telephone service provider is immune from civil liability for complying with an order to transfer a telephone number pursuant to this section. (5) The issuance of a protection order pursuant to this section does not preclude a court from issuing a protective order in a civil proceeding. (6) For purposes of this section: (a) "Account holder" means a defendant who: (I) Is charged with an offense, the underlying basis of which includes an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), or a crime listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1), except for those crimes listed in subsections (1)(cc.5) and (1)(cc.6) of that section; and (II) Maintains an account with a wireless telephone service provider. (b) "Financial responsibility" means an obligation to pay service fees and other costs and charges associated with any telephone number. omestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), or a crime listed in section 24-4.1-302 (1), except for those crimes listed in subsections (1)(cc.5) and (1)(cc.6) of that section; and (II) Maintains an account with a wireless telephone service provider. (b) "Financial responsibility" means an obligation to pay service fees and other costs and charges associated with any telephone number. (c) "Wireless telephone service provider" means a person or entity that provides or resells commercial mobile service, as defined in section 47 U.S.C. sec. 332 (d)(1).

C.R.S. § 18-1-1002 Criminal contempt proceedings - notice to district attorney

18-1-1002. Criminal contempt proceedings - notice to district attorney. Before a criminal contempt proceeding is heard before the court, notice of the proceedings shall be provided to the district attorney for the district of the court where the proceedings are to be heard and the district attorney for the district of the court where the alleged act of criminal contempt occurred. The district attorney for either district shall be allowed to appear and argue for the imposition of contempt sanctions.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1101 Definitions

18-1-1101. Definitions. As used in this part 11, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Disposed of" means evidence is destroyed, thrown away, or returned to the owner or his or her designee. (2) "DNA" means deoxyribonucleic acid. (3) "DNA evidence" means all evidence collected by law enforcement in a criminal investigation, which evidence may be reasonably believed to contain DNA that is relevant to a disputed issue in the investigation and prosecution of the case. (4) "DNA profile" means an identifier obtained as a result of a specific DNA analysis.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1102 Scope

18-1-1102. Scope. (1) The provisions of this part 11 shall apply to the preservation of DNA evidence only when: (a) The investigation of a felony does not result in or has not resulted in charges being filed; or (b) The filed charges resulted in a conviction for a class 1 felony or for a sex offense that carries an indeterminate sentence pursuant to section 18-1.3-1004; or (c) The filed charges resulted in a conviction for a felony not covered by paragraph (b) of this subsection (1); or (d) The filed charges resulted in a conviction for any offense not covered by paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection (1), and at least one of the charges filed involved a sex offense as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5). (2) For purposes of subsection (1) of this section, conviction shall include a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a deferred judgment and sentence. For purposes of paragraph (d) of subsection (1) of this section, conviction shall also include a juvenile delinquent adjudication or deferred adjudication. (3) This part 11 does not impose a statutory duty to retain or store evidence other than in the situations described in this section.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1103 Duty to preserve DNA evidence

18-1-1103. Duty to preserve DNA evidence. (1) A law enforcement agency that collects DNA evidence in conducting a criminal investigation of a felony that does not result in or has not resulted in charges being filed shall preserve the DNA evidence for the length of the statute of limitations for the felony crime that was investigated. (2) Except as provided in sections 18-1-1105 to 18-1-1107, a law enforcement agency that collects DNA evidence in conducting a criminal investigation that results in a conviction listed in section 18-1-1102 (1) shall preserve the DNA evidence for the life of the defendant who is convicted.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1104 Manner and location of preservation of DNA evidence

18-1-1104. Manner and location of preservation of DNA evidence. (1) When DNA evidence that is subject to preservation pursuant to section 18-1-1103 is processed for the development of a DNA profile, the DNA profile shall be preserved by the accredited laboratory in Colorado that develops the DNA profile. If the DNA profile is not developed by an accredited laboratory in Colorado, the laboratory that processes the DNA profile shall send the DNA profile to an accredited laboratory in Colorado for preservation. (2) A law enforcement agency that has custody of DNA evidence that is subject to preservation pursuant to section 18-1-1103 shall preserve the evidence in an amount and manner sufficient to develop a DNA profile, based on the best scientific practices at the time of collection, from the biological material contained in or included on the evidence. If DNA evidence is of such a size, bulk, or physical character as to render retention impracticable, the law enforcement agency shall remove and preserve portions of the evidence likely to contain DNA related to the offense in a quantity sufficient, based on the best scientific practices at the time of collection, to permit future DNA testing. The preserved DNA evidence shall, whenever possible, include a sample sufficient to allow for independent testing by the defendant. After preserving the necessary amount of the DNA evidence, the law enforcement agency may dispose of the remainder of the evidence. (3) If a law enforcement agency is asked to produce DNA evidence that is subject to preservation pursuant to section 18-1-1103 and cannot produce the evidence, the chief evidence custodian for the law enforcement agency shall provide an affidavit in which he or she describes, under penalty of perjury, the efforts taken to locate the DNA evidence and affirms that the DNA evidence could not be located. (4) If upon request a law enforcement agency cannot produce DNA evidence that is subject to preservation pursuant to section 18-1-1103, the court shall determine whether the disposal of the DNA evidence violated the defendant's due process rights, and, if so, the court shall order an appropriate remedy.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1105 Law enforcement agency request for permission to dispose of evidence - procedures

18-1-1105. Law enforcement agency request for permission to dispose of evidence - procedures. (1) A law enforcement agency may not request permission to dispose of DNA evidence in cases described in section 18-1-1102 (1)(a) and (1)(b). (2) In cases described in section 18-1-1102 (1)(c) and (1)(d), a law enforcement agency may seek to dispose of DNA evidence by providing notice, in the form developed pursuant to section 18-1-1108, to the district attorney that prosecuted the charges arising out of the investigation. (3) Upon receipt of the notice described in subsection (2) of this section, the district attorney shall determine whether to object to the disposal of the DNA evidence. The district attorney may determine that a portion of the DNA evidence may be disposed of and a portion of the DNA evidence shall be preserved. (4) (a) If the district attorney determines that the DNA evidence should not be disposed of, the district attorney shall provide notice to the law enforcement agency that the DNA evidence shall be preserved. Upon the receipt of the notice from the district attorney to preserve the DNA evidence, the law enforcement agency shall preserve the DNA evidence until such time as the law enforcement agency is permitted by a court order to dispose of the DNA evidence. (b) (I) If the district attorney determines that all or a portion of the DNA evidence may be disposed of, he or she shall send notice to the defendant and the law enforcement agency specifying which DNA evidence may be disposed of. Notice to the defendant shall include a copy of the notice form prepared by the law enforcement agency pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. (II) The defendant shall have ninety-eight days from the date the notice was sent by the district attorney to file a motion to preserve DNA evidence in the court in which the defendant was convicted. The motion shall state specific grounds supporting the preservation of the DNA evidence, and the defendant shall provide copies of the motion to the district attorney and the law enforcement agency. (III) If no motion is filed within the ninety-eight-day period, the district attorney or the law enforcement agency requesting disposal of the evidence shall file with the court a copy of the notice sent to the defendant pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), and the court shall forthwith, without hearing, enter an order authorizing disposal of the DNA evidence and provide copies of the order to the defendant, district attorney, and law enforcement agency. (IV) If the defendant files a motion, the court shall follow the procedure set forth in subsection (6) of this section. (c) (I) If the law enforcement agency does not receive notice from the district attorney as described in paragraph (a) or (b) of this subsection (4) within a reasonable amount of time or does receive timely notice from the district attorney pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (4), the law enforcement agency may file a motion with the court that entered the conviction in the case in which the evidence was collected, asking for a court order to dispose of the DNA evidence. The motion shall include a copy of the notice the law enforcement agency provided to the district attorney. The law enforcement agency shall provide a copy of the disposal motion to the district attorney and the defendant contemporaneously with the filing of the motion. The law enforcement agency shall specify the DNA evidence for which disposal is requested in the motion. ose of the DNA evidence. The motion shall include a copy of the notice the law enforcement agency provided to the district attorney. The law enforcement agency shall provide a copy of the disposal motion to the district attorney and the defendant contemporaneously with the filing of the motion. The law enforcement agency shall specify the DNA evidence for which disposal is requested in the motion. (II) The defendant or the district attorney shall have ninety-eight days after the disposal motion is sent to file an objection in the court in which the disposal motion was filed. The objection shall state specific grounds supporting the preservation of the DNA evidence. If the district attorney files an objection, the district attorney shall provide copies of the objection to the defendant and the law enforcement agency. If the defendant files an objection, the defendant shall provide copies of the objection to the district attorney and the law enforcement agency. (5) The defendant, through legal counsel, shall have a reasonable right to review the DNA evidence to prepare the filing of a timely objection to the disposal motion or the district attorney's notice received pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of this section. (6) (a) Upon receipt pursuant to subparagraph (II) of paragraph (c) of subsection (4) of this section of a timely filed objection, the court may deny the objection without a hearing if it finds on the face of the objection no grounds supporting the request to preserve the DNA evidence. The court shall then enter an order authorizing disposal of the DNA evidence and provide copies of the order to the defendant, district attorney, and law enforcement agency. (b) If the court determines that a timely filed objection or motion to preserve states adequate grounds to require preservation of the DNA evidence, the court may set a hearing on the objection or motion to preserve, with notice to the district attorney, the law enforcement agency, and the defendant, or the court may deny the disposal motion without a hearing. (c) In considering an objection or motion to preserve pursuant to this subsection (6), the court shall consider the following factors in determining whether to order preservation of the DNA evidence: (I) Whether identification was a disputed issue; (II) Whether the evidence contains known DNA; (III) Whether it is possible to perform DNA testing on the evidence that has not previously been performed; (IV) Whether the defendant has served all of his or her sentence; and (V) Whether the defendant has state appellate or collateral attack rights that have not been exhausted, in which case there shall be a presumption that the DNA evidence should be preserved. (d) Following a hearing on a disposal motion or motion to preserve, the court shall enter an order either authorizing disposal of the DNA evidence or ordering the DNA evidence to be preserved. If the court orders preservation, the order may state the length of time the DNA evidence shall be preserved or establish a condition precedent for the disposition of the DNA evidence.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1106 Defendant request for disposition of or waiver of preservation of DNA evidence - procedures

18-1-1106. Defendant request for disposition of or waiver of preservation of DNA evidence - procedures. (1) In a case described in section 18-1-1102 (1), a defendant may petition the court on his or her own behalf for the disposal of DNA evidence in his or her case. The defendant shall provide a copy of the petition to the district attorney, who may join with or object to the defendant's petition. Upon the filing of the petition, the timing and procedures of section 18-1-1105 shall apply. By filing a petition for disposition of DNA evidence, the defendant waives any right to preservation of that evidence under this part 11. However, a defendant may not be compelled to file a motion under this section in order to obtain a plea or sentence agreement. (2) In a case described in section 18-1-1102 (1), a defendant may waive his or her right to preservation of DNA evidence under this part 11 at any stage of the proceeding by making a knowing and voluntary waiver. A waiver executed as a part of a plea bargain or sentencing agreement shall be voluntarily agreed to by all parties and shall include a written list describing all evidence to be disposed of.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1107 Victim request for disposition of DNA evidence - procedures

18-1-1107. Victim request for disposition of DNA evidence - procedures. In a case described in section 18-1-1102 (1), if DNA evidence is being held that is the property of the victim, as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5), C.R.S., of the crime, the victim may request the district attorney to review whether the DNA evidence may be returned. If the district attorney determines the DNA evidence may be returned, the district attorney may file a petition with the court for the return of the DNA evidence. The district attorney shall provide notice to the defendant of the petition. Upon the filing of the petition, the timing and procedures of section 18-1-1105 shall apply.

C.R.S. § 18-1-1108 Notice - form and sufficiency

18-1-1108. Notice - form and sufficiency. (1) Notice to the defendant as required by this part 11 shall be proper if it is sent by United States mail or hand-delivered to the attorney of record for the defendant as defined in rule 44 of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. If there is no attorney of record, notice to the defendant shall be proper if it is sent by United States mail to the last-known address of the defendant as reflected in the current motor vehicle records or, if no such record exists, the last-known address in the court file. Prior to sending notice by United States mail, however, the district attorney shall first review the department of corrections records to determine whether the defendant is in the physical custody of the department of corrections or on parole. If the defendant is in the physical custody of the department of corrections or on parole, the district attorney shall send notice by United States mail to the correctional facility in which, according to the department's records, the defendant is housed or to the address to which the defendant has been paroled. If the letter is returned because the defendant has been transferred to a different correctional facility, the district attorney shall send notice to the new facility in which the defendant is housed. (2) The department of public safety, in consultation with state and local law enforcement agencies, shall develop a form to be used by all law enforcement agencies for providing notice to the district attorney and the defendant as described in section 18-1-1105 (2).

C.R.S. § 18-1-1109 Court data collection - DNA evidence cases - repeal

18-1-1109. Court data collection - DNA evidence cases - repeal. (Repealed)
Source: Open US Law by Vaquill AI (CC BY 4.0)URL: https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-18.docxFetched: 10/6/2026

Starting a business in Colorado? Colorado LLC guide: costs and requirements