GENERAL PRINCIPLES

RSA tit. LXII, ch. 626

in effect

RSA 626:1 Requirement of a Voluntary Act.

626:1. Requirement of a Voluntary Act. I. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. II. Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:2 General Requirements of Culpability.

626:2. General Requirements of Culpability. I. A person is guilty of murder, a felony, or a misdemeanor only if he acts purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. He may be guilty of a violation without regard to such culpability. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for its commission, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. II. The following are culpable mental states: (a) "Purposely." A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when his conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises the element. (b) "Knowingly." A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance that is a material element of an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. (c) "Recklessly." A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of having voluntarily engaged in intoxication or hypnosis also acts recklessly with respect thereto. (d) "Negligently." A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he fails to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that his failure to become aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. III. When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element is also established if the person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices, the element is also established if the person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices, the element is also established if a person acts purposely. IV. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if the person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears. V. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence or meaning of the law defining the offense is an element of such offense, unless the law so provides. Source. 1971, 518:1. 1973, 370:29, 30, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:3 Effect of Ignorance or Mistake.

626:3. Effect of Ignorance or Mistake. I. A person is not relieved of criminal liability because he acts under a mistaken belief of fact unless: (a) The mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for commission of the offense; or (b) The statute defining the offense expressly provides that such mistake is a defense; or (c) Such mistake supports a defense of justification as defined in RSA 627. II. A person is not relieved of criminal liability because he acts under a mistaken belief that his conduct does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense unless his belief is founded upon a statement of the law contained in a statute or other enactment, or an administrative order or grant of permission, or a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or a written interpretation of the law relating to the offense officially made by a public servant, agency or body legally empowered with authority to administer, enforce or interpret such law. The defendant must prove a defense arising under this subsection by a preponderance of evidence. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:4 Intoxication.

626:4. Intoxication. Intoxication is not, as such, a defense. The defendant may, however, introduce evidence of intoxication whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the offense charged, and it shall be taken into consideration in determining whether such element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:5 Entrapment.

626:5. Entrapment. It is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement official or by a person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement official, for the purpose of obtaining evidence against him and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. However, conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:6 Consent.

626:6. Consent. I. The consent of the victim to conduct constituting an offense is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. II. When conduct constitutes an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to the conduct is a defense if the bodily harm is not serious; or the harm is a reasonably foreseeable hazard of lawful activity. III. Consent is no defense if it is given by a person legally incompetent to authorize the conduct or by one who, by reason of immaturity, insanity, intoxication or use of drugs is unable and known by the actor to be unable to exercise a reasonable judgment as to the harm involved. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:7 Defenses; Affirmative Defenses and Presumptions.

626:7. Defenses; Affirmative Defenses and Presumptions. I. When evidence is admitted on a matter declared by this code to be: (a) A defense, the state must disprove such defense beyond a reasonable doubt; or (b) An affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence. II. When this code establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following consequences: (a) When there is evidence of the facts which give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and (b) When the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact. Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.

RSA 626:8 Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another.

626:8. Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another. I. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. II. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or (b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense; or (c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. III. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits such other person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (b) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. IV. Notwithstanding the requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph III(a), when causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as required for the commission of the offense. V. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. VI. Unless otherwise provided, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (a) He is the victim of that offense; or (b) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (c) He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense or gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. VII. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. Source. 1971, 518:1. 2001, 216:1, eff. Jan. 1, 2002.

Source: New Hampshire General Court (gc.nh.gov)URL: https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/html/NHTOC/NHTOC-LXII-626.htmFetched: 10/20/2026