CRIMINAL LIABILITY DEFENSES

SEA-MC tit. 12A, subtit. I, ch. 12A.04

in effect

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.010 Requirement of a voluntary act—Possession as an act.

12A.04.010 - Requirement of a voluntary act—Possession as an act. A. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. B. The possession of property is a voluntary act if the actor was aware of his physical possession of such property or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. C. For purposes of this section: 1. "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of the actor's effort or determination. 2. "Omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.010, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.030 Kinds of culpability defined.

12A.04.030 - Kinds of culpability defined. A. Intent. A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime. B. Knowledge. A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge when: 1. He or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by an ordinance defining an offense; or 2. He or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by an ordinance defining an offense. C. Recklessness. A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. D. Criminal Negligence. A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. E. Requirement of Wilfulness Satisfied by Acting Knowingly. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements plainly appears. (Ord. 115649, § 2, 1991; Ord. 109674, § 1, 1981; Ord. 109433 § 1(part), 1980: Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.030(2), 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.050 Substitutes for criminal negligence—Recklessness and knowledge.

12A.04.050 - Substitutes for criminal negligence—Recklessness and knowledge. When the Seattle Municipal Code or an ordinance provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (Ord. 109674, § 1, 1981; Ord. 109433 § 1(part), 1980: Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.030(4), 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.060 Culpability as determinant of grade of offense.

12A.04.060 - Culpability as determinant of grade of offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense. (Ord. 109674, § 1, 1981; Ord. 109433 § 1(part), 1980: Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.030(5), 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.080 Divergence between result contemplated and actual result.

12A.04.080 - Divergence between result contemplated and actual result. When intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the purpose or the contemplation of the actor unless: A. The actual result differs from that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or B. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.050(2), 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.090 Divergence between probable and actual result.

12A.04.090 - Divergence between probable and actual result. When recklessly or criminally negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of criminal negligence, of which he should be aware unless: A. The actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or B. The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.050(3), 1973).

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.100 Construction of ordinances with respect to culpability requirements

12A.04.100 - Construction of ordinances with respect to culpability requirements If an ordinance defining an offense does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose absolute liability, it should be construed as defining an offense requiring one of the mental states described in Section 12A.04.030. This section applies to all offenses defined by the laws of this City except those in Chapter 11.56 and Section 12A.09.020. (Ord. 125881, § 3, 2019; Ord. 111853 § 1, 1984: Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.070, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.110 Criminal liability of corporations and persons acting in their behalf.

12A.04.110 - Criminal liability of corporations and persons acting in their behalf. A. As used in this section: 1. "Agent" means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation. 2. "Managerial agent" means an officer or director of a corporation or any other person in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees. 3. "Corporation" has its ordinary meaning and also includes but is not limited to partnerships, professional service corporations, societies and other unincorporated associations whether organized for profit or nonprofit. B. A corporation is guilty of an offense when: 1. The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or 2. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation; or 3. The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation, other than a managerial agent, while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation and the offense is one defined by an ordinance which indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation. C. A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. D. Whenever duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation, any agent of the corporation who knows he has or shares primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is criminally liable for a reckless or, if a managerial agent, for a criminally negligent omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were by law imposed directly upon such agent. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.090, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.120 Criminal attempt.

12A.04.120 - Criminal attempt. A. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he or she does any act: 1. Which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime; and 2. Which strongly corroborates his or her intent to commit that crime. B. If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime, it is no defense to a prosecution of such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be. C. When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute a criminal attempt under this section, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal intent, he or she: 1. Abandoned his or her effort to commit the crime; or 2. Prevented the commission of the crime. D. A person may not be convicted on the basis of the same course of conduct of both an attempt to commit an offense and either complicity in or the commission of that offense. E. This section shall not apply to liability for the conduct of another as defined in Section 12A.04.130. F. An attempt to commit a crime is a misdemeanor. (Ord. 114635 § 2, 1989: Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.100, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.130 Liability for conduct of another—Complicity.

12A.04.130 - Liability for conduct of another—Complicity. A. A person is guilty of an offense if it is attempted or committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable. B. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: 1. Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or 2. He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this subtitle or by the law defining the offense; or 3. He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. C. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: 1. With the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: a. Solicits, commands, or requests such other person to commit it, or b. Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or 2. His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. D. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity. E. Unless otherwise provided by this subtitle or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: 1. He is a victim of that offense; or 2. The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or 3. He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and: a. Deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense, or b. Gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the offense. F. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. G. A person may not be convicted on the basis of the same course of conduct of both the commission of and complicity in that offense. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.110, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.140 Ignorance or mistake.

12A.04.140 - Ignorance or mistake. A. A person shall not be relieved of criminal liability because he engages in conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless: 1. Such factual mistake negates the mental state required for the commission of an offense; or 2. The ordinance defining the offense or ordinance related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or 3. Such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification. B. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is reasonably founded upon an official statement of the law contained in: 1. A statute, ordinance, or other enactment; or 2. An administrative order or grant of permission; or 3. A judicial decision; or 4. An interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such ordinance. C. A defense based upon this section is an affirmative defense. (Ord. 108472 § 1, 1979: Ord. 102843 § 12A.04.130, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.150 Intoxication.

12A.04.150 - Intoxication. No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his/her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his/her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. (Ord. 112541 § 5, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.160 Insanity.

12A.04.160 - Insanity. To establish the defense of insanity, it must be shown that: A. At the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of mental disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an extent that: 1. He/she was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act with which he/she is charged; or 2. He/she was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the particular act charged. B. The defense of insanity must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (Ord. 112541 § 6, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.170 Duress.

12A.04.170 - Duress. A. In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: 1. The actor participated in the crime under compulsion by another who by threat or use of force created an apprehension in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he/she or another would be exposed to immediate death or immediate grievous bodily injury; and 2. That such apprehension was reasonable upon the part of the actor; and 3. That the actor would not have participated in the crime except for the duress involved. B. The defense of duress is not available if the actor intentionally or recklessly places himself/herself in a situation in which it is probable that he/she will be subject to duress. C. The defense of duress is not established solely by a showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her spouse. (Ord. 112541 § 7, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.180 De minimis infractions.

12A.04.180 - De minimis infractions. The court may dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant's conduct: A. Was within a customary license or tolerance not inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; or B. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or C. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisioned by the legislature in forbidding the offense. (Ord. 102843 § 12A.02.230, 1973.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.190 Entrapment.

12A.04.190 - Entrapment. A. In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that: 1. The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person acting under their discretion; and 2. The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise intended to commit. B. The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing only that law enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime. (Ord. 112541 § 8, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.200 Use of force—When lawful

12A.04.200 - Use of force—When lawful The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases, unless prohibited by Section 3.28.145: A. Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting him/her and acting under his/her direction; B. Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has committed a felony and delivering him/her to a public officer competent to receive him/her into custody; C. Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him/her in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his/her possession, in which case the force is not more than is necessary; D. Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property in the control of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to be intended to be open to members of the public; E. Whenever used by a carrier of passengers or his/her authorized agent or servant, or other person assisting them at their request in expelling from a carriage, railway car, vessel, or other vehicle, a passenger who refuses to obey a lawful and reasonable regulation prescribed for the conduct of passengers, if such vehicle has first been stopped and the force used is not more than is necessary to expel the offender with reasonable regard to his/her personal safety; F. Whenever used by any person to prevent a mentally ill, mentally incompetent, or mentally disabled person from committing an act dangerous to himself/herself or another, or in enforcing necessary restraint for the protection of his/her person, or his/her restoration to health, during such period only as is necessary to obtain legal authority for the restraint or custody of his/her person. (Ord. 126096, § 2, 2020; Ord. 122789, § 2, 2008; Ord. 113000, § 1, 1986; Ord. 112541, § 9, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.205 Physical discipline of child.

12A.04.205 - Physical discipline of child. A. The following actions are presumed unreasonable when used to correct or restrain a child: (1) throwing, kicking, burning, or cutting a child; (2) striking a child with a closed fist; (3) shaking a child under age three; (4) interfering with a child's breathing; (5) threatening a child with a deadly weapon; or (6) doing any other act that is likely to cause and which does cause bodily harm greater than transient pain or minor temporary marks. The age, size and condition of the child and the location of the injury shall be considered when determining whether the bodily harm is reasonable or moderate. This list is illustrative of unreasonable actions and is not intended to be exclusive. B. The physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. (Ord. 113000 § 2, 1986.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.210 Reasonable use of force for detention by shopkeeper.

12A.04.210 - Reasonable use of force for detention by shopkeeper. In any criminal action brought by reason of any person having been detained on or in the immediate vicinity of the premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of investigation or questioning as to the ownership of any merchandise, it shall be a defense of such action that the person was detained in a reasonable manner and for not more than a reasonable time to permit such investigation or questioning by a peace officer, by the owner of the mercantile establishment, or by the owner's authorized employee or agent, and that such peace officer, owner, employee, or agent had reasonable grounds to believe that the person so detained was committing or attempting to commit theft or shoplifting on such premises of such merchandise. As used in this section, "reasonable grounds" shall include, but not be limited to, knowledge that a person has concealed possession of unpurchased merchandise of a mercantile establishment, and a "reasonable time" shall mean the time necessary to permit the person detained to make a statement or to refuse to make a statement, and the time necessary to examine employees and records of the mercantile establishment relative to the ownership of the merchandise. (Ord. 112541 § 10, 1985.)

Seattle Mun. Code § 12A.04.215 When use of force is not lawful

12A.04.215 - When use of force is not lawful A person is not justified in using force against another based on the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the defendant, or in which the defendant and victim dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship. (Ord. 126691, § 5, 2022.)

Source: City of Seattle, Seattle Municipal Code and City Charter (Municode Library, library.municode.com)URL: https://library.municode.com/wa/seattle/codes/municipal_code?nodeId=TIT12ACRCO_SUBTITLE_ICRCO_CH12A.04CRLIDEFetched: 11/1/2026