Power to enjoin and temporarily restrain harassment
HRS §604-10.5
in effect604-10.5. Power to enjoin and temporarily restrain harassment
(a) For the purposes of this section:
"Course of conduct" means a pattern
of conduct composed of a series of acts over any period of time evidencing a
continuity of purpose.
"Harassment" means:
(1) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the
threat of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; or
(2) An intentional or knowing course of conduct
directed at an individual that seriously alarms or disturbs consistently or
continually bothers the individual and serves no legitimate purpose; provided
that such course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional
distress.
(b) The district courts shall have the power
to enjoin, prohibit, or temporarily restrain harassment.
(c) Any person who has
been subjected to harassment may petition the district court for a temporary
restraining order and an injunction from further harassment in the district in
which:
(1) The petitioner resides or is temporarily located;
(2) The respondent resides; or
(3) The harassment occurred.
(d) A petition for relief from harassment
shall be in writing and shall allege that a past act or acts of harassment may
have occurred or that threats of harassment make it probable that acts of
harassment may be imminent; and shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under
oath or statement made under penalty of perjury stating the specific facts and
circumstances for which relief is sought.
(e) Upon petition to a district court under
this section, the court may allow a petition, complaint, motion, or other
document to be filed identifying the petitioner as "jane doe" or
"john doe"; provided that the court finds that the "jane
doe" or "john doe" filing is reasonably necessary to protect the
privacy of the petitioner and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or the
defense of the action.
In considering a petition requesting a
"jane doe" or "john doe" filing, the court shall weigh the
petitioner's interest in privacy against the public interest in disclosure.
The court, only after finding clear and
convincing evidence that would make public inspection inconsistent with the
purpose of this section, may seal from the public all documents or portions of
documents, including all subsequently filed documents, that would identify the
petitioner or contain sufficient information from which the petitioner's
identity could be discerned or inferred. Access to identifying information may
be permitted to law enforcement or other authorized authority, in the course of
conducting official business, to effectuate service, enforcement, or
prosecution, or as ordered by the courts.
(f) Upon petition to a district court under
this section, the court may temporarily restrain the person or persons named in
the petition from harassing the petitioner upon a determination that there is
probable cause to believe that a past act or acts of harassment have occurred
or that a threat or threats of harassment may be imminent. The court may issue
an ex parte temporary restraining order either in writing or orally; provided
that oral orders shall be reduced to writing by the close of the next court day
following oral issuance.
(g) A temporary restraining order that is
granted under this section shall remain in effect at the discretion of the
court for a period not to exceed ninety days from the date the order is
granted, including, in the case where a temporary restraining order restrains
any party from harassing a minor, for a period extending to a date after the
minor has reached eighteen years of age. A hearing on the petition to enjoin
harassment shall be held within fifteen days after the temporary restraining
order is granted. If service of the temporary restraining order has not been
effected before the date of the hearing on the petition to enjoin, the court
may set a new date for the hearing; provided that the new date shall not exceed
ninety days from the date the temporary restraining order was granted.
The parties named in the petition may file or
give oral responses explaining, excusing, justifying, or denying the alleged
act or acts of harassment. The court shall receive all evidence that is
relevant at the hearing and may make independent inquiry.
If the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that harassment as defined in paragraph (1) of that definition exists,
it may enjoin for no more than three years further harassment of the
petitioner, or that harassment as defined in paragraph (2) of that definition
exists, it shall enjoin for no more than three years further harassment of the
petitioner, including, in the case where any party is enjoined from harassing a
minor, for a period extending to a date after the minor has reached eighteen years
of age; provided that this subsection shall not prohibit the court from issuing
other injunctions against the named parties even if the time to which the
injunction applies exceeds a total of three years.
Any order issued under this section shall be
served upon the respondent. For the purposes of this section,
"served" means actual personal service, service by certified mail, or
proof that the respondent was present at the hearing at which the court orally
issued the injunction.
Where service of a restraining order or
injunction has been made or where the respondent is deemed to have received
notice of a restraining order or injunction order, any knowing or intentional
violation of the restraining order or injunction order shall subject the
respondent to the provisions in subsection (i).
Any order issued shall be transmitted to the
chief of police of the county in which the order is issued by way of regular
mail, facsimile transmission, or other similar means of transmission.
(h) The court may grant the prevailing party
in an action brought under this section costs and fees, including attorney's
fees.
(i) A knowing or intentional violation of a
restraining order or injunction issued pursuant to this section is a
misdemeanor. The court shall sentence a violator to appropriate counseling and
shall sentence a person convicted under this section as follows:
(1) For a violation of an injunction or restraining
order that occurs after a conviction for a violation of the same injunction or
restraining order, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum jail
sentence of not less than forty-eight hours; and
(2) For any subsequent violation that occurs after a
second conviction for violation of the same injunction or restraining order,
the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum jail sentence of not less
than thirty days.
The court may suspend any jail sentence, except
for the mandatory sentences under paragraphs (1) and (2), upon appropriate
conditions, such as that the defendant remain alcohol- and drug-free,
conviction-free, or complete court-ordered assessments or counseling. The
court may suspend the mandatory sentences under paragraphs (1) and (2) where
the violation of the injunction or restraining order does not involve violence
or the threat of violence. Nothing in this section shall be construed as
limiting the discretion of the judge to impose additional sanctions authorized
in sentencing for a misdemeanor offense.
(j) Nothing in this section shall be construed
to prohibit constitutionally protected activity.
[L 1986, c 69, §1; am L 1992,
c 291, §1; am L 1993, c 215, §3; am L 1996, c 245, §1; am L 1999, c 143, §1; am
L 2011, c 225, §2; am L 2021, c 27, §4; am L 2023, c 81, §2]
Source: Hawaii State Legislature (capitol.hawaii.gov), via Internet Archive capturesURL: http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol13_Ch0601-0676/HRS0604/HRS_0604-0010_0005.htmFetched: 11/10/2026
