422.190. - Proprietary interest protection agreements in hotel/restaurant projects.
(a) Findings and declarations.
(1) In the course of managing real property that it owns or in otherwise carrying out its functions in the public interest, the city and/or the agency may participate in real property development as a property owner, lessor, proprietor, lender, or guarantor, facing similar risks and liabilities as other business entities participating in such ventures. For example, the city or agency may lease its real property under a percentage lease, or otherwise invest or pledge its resources in real estate development projects as an owner, lender, or guarantor. As a result, the city or agency has an ongoing proprietary interest in the development, and thus, has a direct interest in its financial performance.
(2) In such situations, the city or agency must make prudent management decisions, similar to any private business entity, to ensure efficient management of its business concerns, and to maximize benefit and minimize risk. One (1) of those risks is the possibility of labor/management conflict arising out of labor union organizing campaigns. Such conflict may adversely affect the city's or agency's investment in real estate development or other circumstances in which it has a proprietary business interest by causing delay in the completion of a project, and/or by reducing revenues or increasing costs of the project when they are completed.
(3) To minimize these risks in circumstances where costly labor/management conflict has arisen in the past, the city enacts this section requiring that certain employers shall agree, as a condition of the city's or agency's economic involvement in a development project, to expeditious procedures by which their workers can register their preference regarding union representation.
(4) A major potential source of labor/management conflict that threatens the city's or agency's economic interests as a participant in development projects is the possibility of economic action in those developments by labor unions against employers opposing unionization. Experience of municipal and other investors demonstrates that organizing drives pursuant to formal and adversarial union certification processes often deteriorate into protracted and acrimonious labor/management conflict. Such conflict can result in construction delays, work stoppages, picketing, strikes, consumer boycotts, and other forms of "corporate campaigns" which can generate negative publicity and reduced revenues that threaten the city's or agency's proprietary interests.
(5) These risks are heightened in the hotel and restaurant industry because they are so closely related to tourism "a mainstay of Minneapolis" economy. Labor strife in hotel/restaurant projects in which the city or agency is an investor or other economic participant can jeopardize the operation of related tourist and commercial facilities, as well as the city's national reputation as a tourist and convention destination. To minimize that risk in circumstances where costly labor/management conflict has arisen in the past, the city requires that certain specified employers in the hotel and restaurant industry shall agree, as a condition of the city's or agency's economic involvement in a hotel/restaurant project, to nonconfrontational and expeditious procedures by which their workers can register their preference regarding union representation.
(6) These risks of potential labor/management conflict are particularly acute when labor unions seek to organize workers in hotels and restaurants, as labor relations in the hospitality industry in Minneapolis have proven especially contentious, and have resulted in many protests, boycotts and other activities which have disrupted the business of the hotel/restaurant and the tourist industry.
(7) In view of these concerns, the city deems it necessary to approach with great caution any economic participation in a hotel/restaurant project if the city or agency retains a proprietary interest. The city finds that cautionary approach to be particularly appropriate given other possible factors present in such developments, such as the city's or agency's sometimes special proprietary interests or other special concerns identified herein, and/or their complex financing schemes, the possible use of scarce land resources, as well as the dependence of such projects on public "good will" and the special vulnerability of such projects to consumer boycotts, etc.
(8) One method of reducing the risk to the city's or agency's proprietary interests is to require, as a condition of the city's or agency's investment or other economic participation, that employers operating in a development project agree to a lawful, nonconfrontational process for resolving a union organizing campaign expeditiously. That alternative process is a so-called "card-check," wherein employee preference regarding whether or not to be represented by a labor union is determined based on signed authorization cards. Private employers are authorized under existing federal law to agree voluntarily to use this procedure in lieu of election procedures supervised by the National Labor Relations Board.
(9) The city finds, based on local history, that compliance with these procedures will help reduce the possibility of labor/management conflict jeopardizing the city's or agency's proprietary interest in hotel/restaurant development projects. To ensure that card check procedures are required only to the extent necessary to ensure the goal of minimizing labor/management conflict, an employer which agrees to such procedures and performs its obligations under a proprietary interest protection agreement will be relieved of further obligation to abide by those procedures if a union engages in economic action such as striking, picketing, or boycotting the employer in the course of an organizing drive at a site covered by this section.
(10) The sole purpose of this section is to protect the city's or agency's proprietary interests in certain narrowly prescribed circumstances where the city or agency commits its economic resources and its proprietary interests are put at risk by certain forms of labor/management conflict. This section permits the city or agency to act in furtherance of the city's or agency's proprietary interests where analogous private conduct would be permitted. This section is not intended, nor should it be interpreted, to enact or express any generally applicable policy regarding labor/management relations, or to regulate those relations in any way. This section is not intended to favor any particular outcome in the determination of employee preference regarding union representation.
(b) Duty of agency or city. On any hotel/restaurant development project in which the city or agency participates or has a financial interest, the agency's executive director or city's director of community planning and economic development, as applicable, shall determine whether the agency or city, as applicable, has a proprietary interest. All such determinations shall be made on a case-by-case basis pursuant to the standards articulated in subsection (e), subject to the exemptions set forth in subsection (k)(2). Such determinations shall be made in all cases as a necessary precondition of the city's or agency's participation in a development project.
(c) When agreements required. Where the agency's executive director or city's director of community planning and economic development, as applicable, determines that the city or agency has a proprietary interest at risk in a hotel/restaurant development project pursuant to the definition set forth in subsection (e), he or she shall recommend that the board of commissioners or city council, as applicable, adopt a resolution requiring a proprietary interest protection agreement.
(d) Proprietary interest protection agreement. A proprietary interest protection agreement is a written agreement between an employer and a labor organization that provides, at a minimum, the following:
(1) Employee preference regarding whether to be represented by a labor organization for collective bargaining, and if so, by which labor organization, shall be determined based on signed authorization cards in a card check procedure conducted by a neutral third party in lieu of a formal election.
(2) The employer and the labor organization shall at all times refrain from the use of intimidation, reprisal or threats of reprisal, or other conduct designed to intimidate or coerce employees to influence the decision by employees whether to join or be represented by any labor organization.
(3) Signatory labor organizations shall forbear from taking economic action, such as striking or picketing, against the signatory employer at the worksite of an organizing drive covered by this section, so long as the employer complies with the terms of the agreement.
The employer and labor organization may incorporate additional consistent provisions to protect the city's or agency's proprietary interest if they so agree.
(e) Proprietary interest. The city or agency shall be deemed to have a proprietary interest in a hotel/restaurant development project where the agency's executive director or city's director of community planning and economic development, as applicable, determines, on a case-by-case basis, that one (1) or more of the following conditions are met:
(1) That the city or agency, as property owner, receives ongoing revenue such as rent payments under a lease of real property owned by the city or agency for the development of a project, excluding government fees or tax or assessment revenues, or the like, except for tax revenues under the circumstances specified in parts (2) and (3) below.
(2) That the city or agency receives ongoing revenue from a project to repay loans provided by the city or agency to assist the development of said project, including incremental tax revenues generated by the project and used, directly or indirectly, to repay the loan by the city or agency where the proceeds are used for development of that project.
(3) That the city or agency receives ongoing revenue from a project to pay debt service on bonds provided by the city or agency to assist the development of said project, including incremental tax revenues generated by the project and used, directly or indirectly, to pay debt service on bonds by the city or agency where the proceeds are used for development of that project.
(4) That the city or agency has significant assets at risk because it has agreed to underwrite or guarantee the development of a project, or loans related thereto.
(5) That the city or agency has a significant ongoing economic and nonregulatory interest at risk in the financial success of a project which is likely to be adversely affected by labor/management conflict resulting from a union organizing campaign, except that no interest shall be considered "economic and nonregulatory" if it arises from the exercise of regulatory or police powers such as taxation (except as set forth in parts (2) and (3) above), zoning, or the issuance of permits or licenses.
(f) Development project. A development project means a hotel/restaurant project as defined in section 422.30(e).
(g) Employer. Employer means any person, corporation, company, association, limited or general partnership, joint venture, contractor, subcontractor, or other entity who employs individuals at the site of a development project, and whose ongoing economic performance and potential for labor/management conflict can affect the city's or agency's proprietary interest, including, but not limited to, commercial, retail, hospitality, or services enterprises in a development project.
(h) Contracts. Where the board of commissioners or city council, as applicable, has determined by resolution that a proprietary interest protection agreement is required on a development project, any city or agency contract must include a provision requiring any employer on said project to enter into said agreement as essential consideration for the city or agency entering into the contract. "Contract" means a lease, management agreement, service agreement, loan, bond, guarantee, or other similar agreement to which the city or agency is a party and in which the city or agency has a proprietary interest.
(i) Requests for proposal. Any request for proposal or invitation to bid or similar document regarding a city or agency development project must include in such document a summary description of and reference to the policy and requirements of this section. Failure to include description or reference to this section in a request for proposal or similar document shall not exempt any employer otherwise subject to the requirements of this section.
(j) Model agreement. The city or agency may set forth a model proprietary interest protection agreement to provide guidance for compliance with this section.
(k) Scope and exemptions.
(1) Scope. The requirements of this section apply only to the procedures for determining employee preference regarding whether to be represented by a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining and/or by which labor organization to be represented. Nothing in this section requires an employer to recognize a particular labor organization. Nor does any provision of this section require that an employer enter into a collective bargaining agreement establishing the substantive terms and conditions of employment.
(2) Exemptions. The requirements of this section shall not apply to:
a. Employers employing fewer than the equivalent of fifteen (15) full-time or part-time employees at the site of the development project.
b. Any employer signatory to a valid and binding collective bargaining agreement covering the terms and conditions of employment for its employees at that development project, or which has entered into an agreement with a labor organization regarding such employees which agreement provides at least equal protection from the risks of labor/management conflict as provided by the minimum terms provided herein.
c. Any development project where the agency's executive director or city's director of community planning and economic development, as applicable, determines that the risk to the city's or agency's financial or other nonregulatory interest resulting from labor/management conflict is so minimal or speculative as not to warrant concern for the city's or agency's investment or other nonregulatory interest.
d. Any development project that receives less than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) of assistance from the city or agency.
e. Any residential development project.
f. Any multi-tenanted development project that is built on a speculative basis.
g. Any development project that receives only conduit bond financing from the city or agency.
h. Any development project involving a historically designated building.
(l) Enforcement. The city shall investigate complaints that this section has been violated or that a provision in a city or agency contract or subcontract requiring a proprietary interest protection agreement has been breached, and may take any action necessary to enforce compliance, including but not limited to, instituting a civil action for an injunction and/or specific performance.
(m) Severability. If any part or provision of this section, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section, including the application of such part or provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall continue in full force and effect. To this end, the provisions of this section are severable. (98-Or-130, § 1, 11-13-98; 99-Or-154, § 1, 11-24-99; Ord. No. 2016-078, § 16, 11-18-16)