702-204. State of mind required
Except as provided in section 702-212, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. When the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.
COMMENTARY ON §702-204
This section commences the Penal Code's consideration of the
mental aspect or state of mind which will, in most instances, be required for
the imposition of penal liability. It must, of course, be read in conjunction
with the following section defining "element" of an offense and in
conjunction with §702-212 which provides for those relatively few instances
when absolute or strict penal liability will be recognized.
Clear analysis requires that the various distinct ingredients
of an offense be separately recognized and that culpability be required as to
each. These distinct ingredients are (1) the conduct, (2) the attendant
circumstances, and (3) the results of conduct, which are specified in the
definition of an offense and which negative a defense on the merits. Section
702-205 denominates these ingredients as "elements." The analytical
effect of requiring a culpable state of mind with respect to each element should
be obvious. For example, one who intends sexual intercourse with a female whom
he has no reason to suspect is not qualified to consent to the behavior should
not be held to have committed an offense because he intends the act.[1]
The distinct punitive nature of the penal law dictates that
its sanction be reserved for those individuals who can be morally condemned.
The penal law does not, in most instances, condemn a person's conduct alone.
Rather, it condemns the individual whose state of mind with regard to the
individual's conduct, attendant circumstances, and the result of the
individual's conduct, exhibits an intent to harm, an indifference to harming,
or a gross deviation from reasonable care for protected social values. Thus we
have limited penal liability to those individuals who act intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently contrary to values protected by the Code.
The four types of mental states which the Code recognizes as
sufficient for penal liability (intent, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence) are defined in subsequent sections.
When a particular state of mind is required to establish the
elements of an offense, it will usually be specified in the definition of the
offense, however it may be separately specified by another provision of law.
In the absence of any such specification, intent, knowledge or recklessness
will suffice. Negligence with respect to the element of an offense will not
establish that element unless specifically so provided.
The previous Hawaii law runs the gamut of what has been
called, "the variety, disparity and confusion" of attempts to state "the
requisite but elusive mental element" of penal offenses.[2] For example,
assault required that the defendant act intentionally and maliciously, whereas
battery required that the defendant act unlawfully and intentionally. Crimes
involving bribery of officials or influencing of jurors required that the
defendant act "corruptly." Child stealing required that the
defendant act "maliciously by fraud, force or deception." Murder in
the first degree required that the defendant act "with deliberate
premeditated malice aforethought." Negligent homicide, which was limited
to causing death by operation of a vehicle, required "grossly negligent"
operation for a first degree (felony) conviction, but only "negligent"
operation for a second degree (misdemeanor) conviction.[3] When the courts
have dealt with the requisite state of mind, their suggestions have not always
been helpful. In a case of extortion where the statutory language read "wilfully
and corruptly extorts," the court suggested that a correct indictment
should read "unlawfully, wilfully, corruptly, feloniously and extorsively
did extort..."[4]
It is safe to say that, for the purpose of the penal law,
there are no subtleties of meaning in the language used in the prior law which
cannot be achieved in a clear, lucid fashion by limiting the relevant states of
mind to intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §702-204
The legislature adopted §702-204 of the Proposed Draft
without change. However, the reader should carefully analyze the changes which
the legislature made to part V of chapter 707, dealing with sex offenses, to
determine whether the legislature intended to create an exception to the
general principle expressed in §702-204. See also, Supplemental Commentaries
on §§702-206 and 702-213, and 707-704 and the commentaries thereon.
[L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; gen ch 1993]